Author Topic: Iran's SSMs (Surface to Surface Missiles) (Read 42695 times)

Catsoo · « **on:** August 31, 2009, 02:02:33 PM »

Warning:Source is Zionist

New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities


New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities	Small \| Large

Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel's Missile Defense Organization, spoke about the increased missile capabilities that Iran is developing at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

catsoo

Catsoo · « **Reply #1 on:** September 14, 2009, 03:19:54 PM »

Secret Iranian Missile Memos

posted Monday September 14, 2009 under iran, proliferation-networks by geoffrey_forden

I have been given a series of what appear to be internal secret Iranian documents by sources I trust. If authentic, and I believe they are, they provide important insights into Iran’s missile development program and have important implications for North Korea’s as well. Unfortunately, to protect my sources and the Iranians who spirited these documents out to the West, I cannot be too explicit about their contents. The following examination of these memos contains both information from and my analysis of them. I have tried to explicitly point out what is my speculation.

A “Loose” Development Consortium

The memos cover, in a somewhat sketchy way, a lot of ground. Perhaps the most important aspects are those that deal with how several countries collaborate in either developing missiles or selling missile technology to Iran. The memos use codes for the different collaborator countries but I think I know the meanings of the codes. If my understanding is correct, they indicate that representatives from North Korea and China have been present at all phases of production and flight testing. Iran has also gotten important help from Russia, though Russians do not appear to have been as ubiquitous as the Chinese and the North Koreans. The evidence from the memos indicates that this help is on the governmental level rather than “rogue” individuals. This includes Russian help though Russia has been particularly vocal in its denials of such assistance. Despite these denials, the evidence of foreign assistance, both images of engines and turbopumps that are obviously of Russian origin—either their actual production or at the very least their designs—and these internal Iranian memos, make the case overwhelmingly.

The strong implication in the memos is that this assistance was sought by Iran to reduce the risk of project failure. (See my discussion, on paths proliferators might take.) However, the exchange of technology is not automatic, as it would be in a shared development program. Iran appears to have decided that it will try to solve problems as they come up in an effort to develop indigenous capabilities. Under this acquisition strategy, transfer of technology or know-how, even the exchange of opinions, must be approved on what appears to be a case by case basis by a central authority. This could be an explanation for why North Korea’s U’nha-2 failed during its third stage even though it appears to use the Safir’s second stage; a stage that Iran had problems with but eventually got to work. The solution to that problem under this type of collaboration would not have automatically been shared and either North Korea did not ask for it or Iran refused to share it.

Several of the memos also highlight one area that Iran says it does need help in: the production of advanced solid and liquid propellant. They say that while Iran has tried to produce such fuels on its own, they indicate that the problems they have run into are best solved to purchasing complete propellant production plants from outside sources.

These memos have, at least for me, put Iran’s missile development strategy in a different light. Iran is clearly mustering its industrial and intellectual infrastructure to produce long range missiles and, more importantly, to assimilate the know-how to design and produce more advanced missiles in the future. It is not, however, doing this independently of more advanced nations. In fact, it still needs to rely on them for help in quickly solving problems as they come up and for purchasing complete production facilities if they find a process too hard for efficient indigenous production. But Iran is picking and choosing, in a strategic fashion, the problems it wants to solve on its own and those it wants help with. All of this is done in a concerted effort to become an independent designer and manufacturer of long range missiles in as short a time as possible.

Kavoshgar’s Development Program

I have always wondered what Iran was doing in the Kavoshgar flight of 4 February 2008. It is, of course, possible that it was simply a “sounding rocket” flight using a “standard” Shahab-3 missile but I have always suspected it was more. Several of the memos, however, give an interesting insight into the Kavoshgar’s place in Iran’s missile development program. They suggest that several flights of the Kavoshgar were failures while only one Kavoshgar flight was announced on 4 February 2008. The Iranians attribute at least one of these failures to a fuel flow problem but also mention problems with the jet vanes(!) which they blame on very low quality imported graphite. I take these references to other Kavoshgars as referring to previous missile flights that were publicized under other names, like the Ghadr, which was first displayed during a military parade in 2007. They might also include a Shahab missile flown during the Great Prophet III war games in July 2008.

That, unfortunately, gets us into a discussion of names, both Iranian and Western, for different versions of the Shahab missiles; a subject that I wish I could avoid. If you do a Google search for “Shahab” you find things like Shahab-3B, Shahab-3M, Shahab-3ER, Shahab-3C, and Ghader-1, but I suspect that several of these are just different Western analysts’ names for the same missile. (The memos indicate, rather cryptically, that there are five members of the Shahab family of missiles. I’m sure we could have a very lively discussion about what that means.) For what it is worth, I think the Shahab family includes the Shahab-3 (essentially a Nodong with a steel airframe and two propellant storage tanks; the fuel being in front of the oxidizer); a Shahab-3B (similar to the Shahab-3 but with a reduced warhead mass in a “baby-bottle nosecone”—hence my designation of “B”—as shown on the left, which increases accuracy during reentry, and possibly has an aluminum airframe); and the “enhanced” Shahab or Shahab-E, which is the Iranian designation, and I assume is like the Shahab-3B but with two oxidizer tanks in front of the fuel tank. It is of course possible that what I have termed the Shahab-3B also uses two oxidizer tanks but then there is no meaningful differences between these two types and they both should be classified as Shahab-E’s.

There are some minor external differences visible between the Shahab-3B and the Shahab-E but it is possible both have an aluminum airframe. These differences are a slight increase in height for the Shahab-E and a slight difference in where the external cable track leading from the navigation units just behind the warhead to the thrust vector control at the rear of the exhaust nozzle. However, the really important difference is that I believe the Shahab-E has two oxidizer tanks and that both are in front of the fuel tank, reversing their order when compared to the Shahab-3B because the reduced warhead weight and the increased drag from the more complex warhead shape both increase the potential instability of the design. Splitting the oxidizer tank in two increases the aerodynamic stability by allowing the rocket to first use the lower oxidizer tank and then, as I mentioned above, I believe the Kavoshgar is an enhanced Shahab.

“Fuel flow problems” suggests that the Kavoshgar design has changed the system for feeding propellant into the combustion chamber. Unfortunately, we need a great deal of speculation to carry this further. However, two possibilities immediately suggest themselves when coupled with speculations about splitting the oxidizer tank into two to increase stability. One is that moving the oxidizer tank forward has changed the feed line resistance to pumping the oxidizer into the combustion chamber. If the turbopump has not been changed—a change that would entail a major re-engineering effort—then it is conceivable that bubbles (or cavitation) have started to form in the turbopump, causing instabilities in the propulsion. However, these bubbles would tend to form at the very beginning of the flight when the acceleration of the missile is lowest. Videos of the launch give no indication that such instabilities occur, though that does not rule them out.

Another possibility is the process of switching from one oxidizer tank to another. Seemingly simple procedures like this can cause significant engineering problems; problems that might not show up in the portions of video shown of the Kavoshgar flight but only halfway through the powered portion of the trajectory.

In either case, or perhaps in a third possibility not considered here, the solution eluded Iranian engineers and they were authorized to consult foreign experts.

The Safir Rocket

Some of the most interesting points of a subset of the memos arise during their discussion of the Safir, the two stage rocket that Iran used to orbit a satellite in February 2009. Those state that the airframes for both the first and second stages came from the enhanced Shahab. (This, by the way, rules out the Sejil being the Shahab-E since solid propellant rockets need considerably thicker and heavier airframes to contain the pressures associated with their combustion.) Another interesting feature unique to the Safir is a guidance system said in some of the memos to use GPS, a feature we will return to below.

Some analysts have questioned the Safir’s second stage ability to lift heavy payloads, arguing that Iran had to reduce the strength of the second stage structure to enable it to lift even a small satellite into space. Their implication was clearly that if the same structure was used on a missile carrying a heavy warhead, it would collapse. However, their hypothesis is drawn into serious question if the Safir’s second-stage airframe really did come from a Shahab-E. If there are no such structural issues, then a military version of the Safir could lift a one ton warhead into much of Europe.

One of the biggest changes for the Safir from previous missile’s flown by Iran, according to some of these memos, is its guidance system. Not only is it a two stage missile with a new and more efficient way of controlling the second stage’s flight, using two gimbaled engines, the memos also say it uses GPS as well as inertial guidance systems like gyroscopes. Other space-faring powers have, of course, gotten along perfectly well with pure inertial guidance system for putting a satellite into orbit. So we are left looking around for applications that Iran might find more easily accomplished using GPS. One possibility is that Iran found it difficult to control the second stage’s flight without at least a check on the inertial measurements with a GPS. Unfortunately, the real reason will depend on the details of Iran’s internal capabilities, capabilities that are very difficult to know or judge as outside observers. One thing that is clear from the memos is that GPS is only being used in the Safir because its mission is to put a satellite into orbit. It will not be used for military missiles which might be subject to the US turning off the precision coverage.

Final Thoughts

Understanding the paths proliferators take to acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, and in particular Iran’s efforts, are subjects of immense importance that many different analysts have been and continue to struggle with. After all, if we can understand how successful proliferators operate, we can adjust our nonproliferation regimes to be more effective. These memos show that proliferators are desperately trying to gain that indigenous capability but they also show that the proliferators still have a long way to go. As proliferators develop their own advanced industrial base, our supply-side nonproliferation regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—where supplier countries agree to not ship certain technologies to suspect countries—will become less and less effective. We will have to evolve those regimes to deal with the changing technological landscape. Unfortunately, the memos also show that not all countries that have signed up with those regimes have fully committed themselves to following the agreements.

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2458/secret-iranian-missile-memos

Ayyash · « **Reply #2 on:** September 14, 2009, 10:34:00 PM »

^^^Thats an intense article, and ACW always has great information.

It would be amazing to see the article that got smuggled out rather then just his interpretation of it, but it doesn't look like that will be happening.
It doesn't say when the memo was published but I'm really surprised that it doesn't include a substantial section on the Sejill. Could this indicate that they're choosing not to follow that path but instead are following the 'reliable' Shahab and the experimental portions are covered by the Kavoshgar SLV?

Shirazi · « **Reply #3 on:** September 15, 2009, 04:39:00 PM »

I don't believe that a memo got smuggled out. I doubt that there is a "memo" detailing everything about Irans missile program which is allowed to be smuggled out, by an Iranian of all people and then delivered to ACW.

Ayyash · « **Reply #4 on:** September 15, 2009, 09:20:24 PM »

^^^I was thinking about that possibility also. If it is true it means that someone in the Iranian defense industry is capable of leaking top secret information to the west, which is never a good sign.

Catsoo · « **Reply #5 on:** September 15, 2009, 09:35:12 PM »

Even if the story is true, it is a huge propaganda for Iran in this case.

catsoo

Catsoo · « **Reply #6 on:** October 04, 2009, 03:46:41 PM »

Warning: Source is Zionist

Iran’s missile program making steady progress

An interview with Uzi Rubin

September 17, 2009

Mr. Uzi Rubin, an Israeli engineer who formerly ran Israel’s “Arrow” program for missile defense, gives high marks to Iran’s recent success in making long-range missiles, and predicts that Iran would use these missiles in saturation attacks with high explosives in time of war.

In a recent interview with Iran Watch, Mr. Rubin emphasized that Iran successfully developed the design for both its solid-fuel ballistic missile and its liquid-fuel space launcher after only a few test flights, showing that the Iran's missile industry is capable of recovering from test failures in relatively short time

Mr. Rubin believes Iran largely has the capability to build longer range missiles. He predicts that Iran will focus increasingly on solid fuel technology, which is easier to scale up in order to reach longer ranges. However, for political reasons, Iran is playing down this capability for fear of alienating Europe and Russia. With a range of 2,000 km, Iran’s two-stage, solid fuel Sejil [and variants] can already reach all mid eastern targets from eastern Iran.

The following is an edited transcript of our conversation.

Iran Watch (IW): What do you think about Iran’s space program, and the recent rocket tests?

Uzi Rubin (UR): I was impressed by the space launcher, especially its design. The first stage is a souped-up Shahab 3. The second stage is liquid fuel, but it's storable liquid fuel. This is one step beyond basic, non-storable liquid fuel like what’s used in Scuds. And it’s not only storable, it’s also hypergolic. That means you don't have to light the propellant, you just pump it into the motor and it spontaneously ignites. Iran managed to design a very elegant second stage – and also very light. The overwhelming majority of countries starting out with space launch technology started with three stages. Why? Because it's easier to reach orbital velocity with three stages than with two stages. Doing it with only two stages places very stringent requirements on the second stage. But Iran did it. Everyone was surprised. This is something we didn’t expect. I'd say it was an audacious achievement for a starting country.

IW: Were you surprised that Iran had mastered staging? Staging is not easy.

UR: Well, staging is challenging, but I'm not surprised. When Iran announced its space program back in 1998, this obviously meant they were going to rely on staging. So I wasn’t surprised that they did it. Staging is key to a space program. I was surprised that it worked so well the first time.

I was also surprised that Iran progressed so quickly. In February 2008, Iran fired a missile it called Kavoshgar, which was a Shahab-3, probably with a slightly stronger motor and painted in blue and white because it was flown by the space agency, not by the military. It had a typical triconic front end – what’s called the baby bottle front end – but with some changes. This test flight showed all the signs of failure. I tracked the video frame by frame. You could see pieces falling off while it was taking off, and then the whole thing exploded violently. That was the first launch. Iran claimed the test was successful, but we saw it as a dismal failure. Six months later, in August, Iran fired its first space launcher [Safir]. No pieces fell off. That indicates ample telemetry data from the failed test, which allowed Iranian engineers to figure out what went wrong in February. They than displayed good engineering: they fixed the problem. Finally, the short recovery time – only six months – indicates vigorous program management. While Iran's regime is radical and belligerent, and the success of its endeavors is bad news for the Middle East and the international community – as an engineer, I take my hat off.

But the August test was still a failure. Six months after that, in February 2009, the rocket worked. Within one year Iran had moved from a failed design to a successful one and launched a satellite into good, stable orbit. Again, this progress is a sign of good system engineering and good program management. Both are crucial. Not the technology. You can acquire technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTRC) appears to be dysfunctional as far as Iran is concerned. They seem be able to buy anything from anywhere. Perhaps not from the United States, and there may be some difficulties in Europe. But they apparently have other venues for acquisition of missile related materials and components. .

IW: Is this space launcher an indigenous design?

UR: I am not sure. But look, even if somebody designed it for Iran, if Iran had access to this design, then it's like having the design capability at home. The legacy for the overall design is Soviet. But when I say Soviet, it doesn't mean Russian.

I think the Iranians have taken off. They have learned what they were taught and are proceeding.

IW: Could Iran’s success depend on technical assistance received remotely, from experts who are not physically present in Iran?

UR: No, to support a program you have to be there physically to communicate face to face with the technical teams. It’s my guess that what we are seeing is already largely indigenous Iranian capability. They’re developing a technological culture, which is unique in the Middle East. They’re adapting science as part of their national policy. Iran hosts aerospace conferences, once or twice a year, and Iranian engineers contribute papers to American conferences. So, Iran is developing a strong scientific base.

Iran’s missile program is now 20 years old. There has been enough time to graduate a number of engineers from Iranian universities. Those who graduated 15-20 years ago are now program leaders.

IW: Is Iran ahead of North Korea?

UR: So it would seem. In addition to the space launcher’s liquid fuel technology, Iran also has a solid propellant missile: the Sejil, or Ashura or Sejil 2. Iran changes the names, but that’s just psychology. It’s the same missile. In 2005, Iran’s defense minister made a statement claiming to have made a solid propellant rocket motor for the Shahab missile. Obviously what he meant was that Iran was working on solid propellant rockets with the diameter of the Shahab. Thirty months later, the first Iranian solid propellant, two-stage ballistic missile made its first flight.

The solid fuel missile is a breakthrough, because it gives Iran a growth potential that it didn’t have with liquid fuel rockets. In liquid rockets, there are difficulties in making rocket motors that are large enough but still stable. When you increase the combustion chamber of a liquid fuel motor, you can get severe combustion instability problems. With solid fuel, once you have a breakthrough and you can make rocket motors, increasing their size is pretty straightforward.

IW: What is the diameter of the current solid fuel missile?

UR: The same as the diameter as the liquid fuel missile: 1.25 meters.

The most important dimension of a missile is its diameter. The production line is geared to this diameter. If you change the diameter of a missile by even by a couple of inches, you have to redo much of your infrastructure. So, once you have a diameter you stick to it. This is especially true for missiles on mobile launchers, because if you change the diameter, you have to make significant changes to the launcher as well. So, the diameter of Iran’s solid fuel missile is 1.25 meters, which is the same as the space launcher and the same as the Shahab-3 missile. This diameter was inherited from North Korea. The North Koreans did the trick of enlarging, or scaling up the Scud. So it makes sense that the solid fuel missile has the diameter of the Shahab, which came from North Korea, and of the launcher of the Shahab, slightly adapted, and that it has two stages with the same diameter.

IW: How would you rate the solid fuel missile?

UR: I compare Iran’s solid fuel missile to the U.S. Minuteman-1, of 1961. I claim these missiles are comparable. Americans are shocked when I say this, but remember that Minuteman-1 was a first generation solid propellant missile, first flown half a century ago and therefore primitive compared to what the United States can do today. In fact, in some sense the Sejil is more advanced, not because the Iranians are so smart, but because of the march of technological innovations between than and now. Previously, achieving accuracy was a daunting challenge that required the top technological brains in the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, you can buy GPS accuracy in any consumer electronics shop for less than $200. You still have to design a GPS system that will withstand acceleration and work in a vacuum, but that’s a project for graduate students in aeronautical engineering at Tehran University. It doesn’t require any great ingenuity. So, Iran can make the missiles as accurate as they wish. An off-the-shelf GPS is accurate to the width of a street – 20 meters.

IW: Is there anything unique about Iran’s design for the solid fuel missile?

UR: The jet vanes are an interesting design feature. In solid fuel missiles, jet vanes are usually used for the initial phase of the flight. But the Iranians managed to make jet vanes that survived the full 50 or 60 seconds of the first-stage flight. Solid propellant exhaust contains aluminum oxide; it’s very abrasive. If the jet vanes don't survive during the entire burn, missile control is lost. That’s why in some solid propellant rockets, like in Russia, jet vanes are discarded after a few seconds and control is done either by air vanes or by some other means, for instance by secondary injection.

IW: What about the missile casing? What is it made of?

UR: Probably maraging steel. Iran is on record trying to buy it. Some attempts were foiled. But again, the Indians bought maraging steel for their missiles. The only problem with maraging steel is that Iran would need to get maraging steel forgings as well. This may be difficult. But the fact that the Indians got them means that somebody is offering them on the market.

IW: Is there any other specialized equipment or material that Iran needs to buy in order to improve or scale-up the missile?

UR: Sure, you need some blenders, big mixers. You also need casting pits, test stands, and big x-ray machines for inspections. To develop these things on your own is difficult – they are very specialized. So, you need to buy them. By the way, all of this equipment is strictly controlled by the MTRC. But the fact that the Sejil took off successfully and completed its mission means that the Iranians have this infrastructure. They bought it. It shouldn’t be in Iran but it is.

So, the proficiency is there and it can be scaled up. Based on an analysis of the Sejil’s first flight, I estimate ten tons for the first stage and a five ton second stage. This is the optimum proportion. Now, to make a 20 ton first stage, if you have the infrastructure, it’s straightforward. Any well run program could have the first motor on the test stand in two years from green light.

IW: Is there anything stopping Iran from scaling up this missile, from a technical perspective?

UR: Iran has everything it would need for such a program except perhaps external thermal protection for the re-entry vehicle. They have a triconic shaped re-entry vehicle that works for 2,000 km but not for intercontinental ranges. It may still be dependant on internal insulation like the old Soviet-era Scud design. Images of the Sejjil show it with a black nose tip, probably made of some ablative graphite material, but with no external insulation. Right now, I would estimate that this missile could carry a 1,000 kg payload to a range between 2,200 and 2,450 km. But, if Iran decides to go for ranges beyond 2,000 km, it will need an external heat shield. This is a challenge, but the Iranians already have the key to overcome it. Their capability to make a 50 - 60 second, 10 ton rocket motor which survives the full burn time means they can do internal heat shielding. From this, the leap to external heat shielding is not too great. Eventually they’ll be able to do an external heat shield for longer ranges. I’d say that Iran has either fully formed technology or embryonic technology for every aspect of a very long range missile.

IW: You said that Iran has managed to circumvent control regimes like the MTRC to buy what it needs; who is selling to Iran? What are they selling?

UR: The open record shows that they managed to buy bars of tungsten copper alloy from China – exactly the MTCR controlled material used for solid propellant missile jet vanes. Iran may have imported tungsten copper plates and cut them into jet vanes. The Iranians might also try to get tungsten copper powder and sinter the material themselves. This is another hallmark for Iran: self reliance.

IW: How far has the solid fuel missile been tested?

UR: A few hundred kilometers. But that’s not important. Iran is testing the technology. The range potential is probably at least 2,000 km.

IW: Does Iran have space inside its country to test a missile to 2,000 km?

UR: I'm not sure but I don't think so. I believe that to fire to 2,000 km or more from its Semnan test site, outside of Tehran, Iran would have to go into splash down – the missile would come down in the ocean. Bur Iran has a free ocean all the way to the South Pole. And no part of the missile would fall in any other country. So, Iran has no issue in terms of testing an intercontinental-range missile.

IW: Do you think Iran will test to 2,000 km?

UR: If they do so it will not serve their interests at present, because firing to this range may be politically sensitive. Yet Iran might eventually find some excuse to test to longer ranges, by citing changed circumstances. The range within Iran is about 1,800 km. That’s the longest range point to point. There is no need at present for Iran to test further than that. If the missile flies successfully to 1,800 km it stands to reason that it will be able to fly to 2,000 km too.

IW: So 1,800 km is sufficient to test the re-entry vehicle and the guidance system for longer ranges?

UR: Up to a point. You don’t need to test to the full range to see if it will fly to the full range, provided that the shorter range is stressing enough. Of course, you couldn’t rely on a 300 km test flight to know how the missile would perform at a range of 2,000 km, but if you cover 80% of the range, then you are in the right ballpark.

IW: Could the current missile carry a nuclear warhead?

UR: If you are talking about the weight requirements – that is, if your question is whether the current missile has the lifting capability to sufficient to carry a first generation nuclear warhead, I think that the answer is positive. The question whether the current missile has the special adaptation to interface and successfully activate a nuclear warhead is another matter, and I'm not sure that they are there yet. But I must be clear on one important point here. The new triconic warhead is not a move toward accommodating a nuclear warhead. This warhead has less volume than the conical warhead Iran was using before. And the diameter of the central section is about 60 cm, which is very constrained for a nuclear bomb. It could be a gun type, but that would be heavy. I’m guessing that the conical nosecone had a stability problem that was stressing the missile and harming its accuracy. The triconic shape is naturally stable if designed correctly, which would improve accuracy. I’d say the new shape is designed for simplicity and accuracy, not necessarily for nuclear capability.

IW: But why else would Iran need such a missile if not to carry a nuclear weapon?

UR: From a western point of view, long range ballistic missiles make sense only when they carry a nuclear weapon. This is a legacy of Cold War thinking. The Iranians don’t see it that way. Missiles are for them what both tactical and strategic air power are for the West. You can see this from what Iran displays in military parades: old hardware, old tanks, some of them from the 1950s, and half of the aircraft were bought before the Islamic revolution. Iran is building long range strike power through missiles. And not only Iran is doing this, so is Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas…for them, the rocket is king, not the combat aircraft.

IW: So the money is not there for the aircraft?

UR: No. The money is in missiles and in nuclear technology. In the missile program, you see the effect of this huge investment. Today, Iran has made a great leap forward in technical proficiency and in its capability to design and integrate ballistic missiles. The key ingredient here is not just the building of a rocket motor or a re-entry vehicle, the key is system engineering, along with system integration, and program management – all three are important and tied together.

IW: Would Iran use its missiles, armed with conventional warheads, in some sort of saturation strategy?

UR: Saturation in war time, yes. Iran will use its missiles if it is attacked. And they’ve developed bomblet warheads. Iran claims the results would be very destructive.

IW: So, Iran would arm its missiles with such warheads and use them as a sort of long range air power, an alternative to aircraft?

UR: Yes, why not? Iran is making a lot of missiles. The Iranians believe in conventional missiles. Not just for saturation but also to take out specific targets. They believe that their cluster warheads can take out airfields. Remember, they have practically no air force to do it. Their main striking power is based on missiles.

IW: So Iran would have to manufacture a lot of missiles and arm them with these warheads. And with the 2,000 km range, Iran would be able to base the missiles further east.

UR: Yes, giving them survivability. And the Iranians are not hiding it – on the contrary, they are bragging about it openly. . They are transparent; they want to deter any U.S. or Israeli attack. Iranian leaders openly wish for U.S. satellites to take pictures of their weapon sites and to see their capability. Mark this: for Iran, ballistic missiles are not weapons of last resort. They see them as legitimate weapons of war to be used in any conflict.

IW: What’s next for Iran in terms of missile development?

UR: Watch for Iranian long range cruise missiles. I think that air breathing cruise missiles will be the next long range missile to appear. The Iranians will probably reverse engineer the KH-55s they got a few years ago via Ukraine. The main problem here is the jet engines. Making small fan jet engines is an expertise. Iran will need to buy it. The United States and France won’t sell, so Iran will have to find other sources. The initial design for these missiles will not be nuclear-capable because their carrying capacity would likely be small. So they would be armed with conventional warheads as well. Later generation could become nuclear-capable.

Otherwise, expect Iran to pursue solid propellant. We’ll probably see the liquid propellant program dying out. There won’t be a long-range, liquid fuel missile. The Iranians will keep liquid fuel for the space program for now, but for ballistic missiles they’ll be drawn to solid propellant. And if they want to put larger, heavier satellites into orbit, they may use a modified Sejil.

We’ll see more and more variations of the Sejil, just as we saw with Iran’s Shahab-3, which has three sub-variations that we can identify. The original Shahab-3 missile could hit Israel from western Iran. The more advanced variations can strike from further east. Sejil is the first generation and we’ll see a second and third generation.

IW: Do you have an idea of production volume for the Sejil?

UR: No. But I predict that the next step on this missile will be a move to better solid propellant rocket motors, and to filament winding in order to take advantage of composite materials. Whoever sold Iran the infrastructure to make metal casings will sell them the infrastructure to make composite materials. Also, better metals will be used for thrust vectoring.

IW: Will Iran seek to add a third stage to the solid fuel missile?

UR: This is not a technical question, it’s political. Iran has the infrastructure, it has the proficiency, and it has the design know-how. So, it is a question of intention. Will Iran add a third stage? Or make a bigger first stage motor? Iran is probably not eager to do this overtly because it is aware of the political implications. The Iranians are very aware of the meaning, for Europe, of longer range missiles. So, right now I don’t think it’s in their interest to do it openly. Actively running a full scale long range missile program may not be on the agenda, for now. But the Iranians may have a paper program for longer range missiles.

IW: There is a parallel here with the nuclear program. In both cases, Iran is seeking to build up its capability without causing alarm.

UR: Yes, the Iranians are careful to remain within the limits of legitimacy. They push the outer limit, but they are careful not to go beyond it, at least openly. This is the case in their nuclear program and – for the time being – in their missile program. You can expect this policy to continue as long as it serves Iran's interest. What they are planning behind closed doors is another question – and a very troubling one.

http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/roundtables/interview-rubin-091709.htm

Shirazi · « **Reply #7 on:** October 04, 2009, 05:28:32 PM »

I enjoy reading Uzi Rbuin's assessments of Iran's Missile program although he does try to stress the missiles (non existing) threat to europe.

Catsoo · « **Reply #8 on:** October 16, 2009, 04:13:43 PM »

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program

Author: Greg Bruno, Staff Writer

October 15, 2009

Introduction

U.S. President Barack Obama cited the rising threat of Iran's ballistic missile program as a key driver in his decision to alter course on a Bush-era missile shield for Europe. Tehran's arsenal is now "capable of reaching Europe," the president said in September 2009. Less than two weeks after that assertion--and hours after world powers disclosed a secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom--Tehran's Revolutionary Guards staged a full weekend of test firings, blasting a series of medium- and short-range missiles in a show of military strength (NYT). Western defense analysts say the missiles tested have a range sufficient to reach Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, while Iranian General Abdullah Araqi claimed that Iran's arsenal now has the ability to "hit any place from which a threat is posed to Iran." But many questions remain about Iran's ballistic missile program. Western analysts can't say for sure how far Iranian technology has advanced, and experts frequently question Tehran's assertions on range and payload size. And much like Iran's nuclear program, international observers are largely left to guess at Iranian intentions.

The Rise of Iran's Arsenal

Ballistic missiles--armaments that achieve suborbital spaceflight to hit their targets thousands of miles away--have been stockpiled in Iran since the early days of the Islamic Revolution. Iran maintained a healthy fleet of combat aircraft under the shah, but after 1979, relations with the West frayed and access to technologies needed to maintain its air force dried up. According to a 2005 report published by the British-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Tehran's program was launched in part to make up for these deficiencies. Dinshaw Mistry, author of Containing Missile Proliferation, writes that Iran's missile program evolved in several phases (Arms Control Association). Beginning in the mid-1980s, as Iraqi missiles rained down on Iranian cities, Iran purchased short-range Scud missiles from North Korea. Steven A. Hildreth, a missile defense specialist with the Congressional Research Service, a nonpartisan U.S.-funded agency, assesses that Iran's ballistic missile program was in full development by the mid-1980s (PDF), and during the Iran-Iraq War, "reportedly launched more than 600 ballistic missiles." By 1998, Iran had built and tested a medium-range missile, the Shahab-3, a single-stage liquid-fueled missile modeled after the North Korean Nodong. Since then, Iran has embarked on a number of other missile projects, with advances in solid-fuel and multistage missile systems, theoretically enhancing survivability on the ground and range in flight.

Current Weapons Stocks

Defense analysts say despite Iran's public pronouncements and frequently publicized test firings, assessments of Iranian hardware are largely speculative. Indeed, many Western reports offer contradictory findings, with different missile names, ranges, inventory numbers, and other characteristics for even the most commonly cited systems. The Federation of American Scientists, an advocacy group that promotes disarmament, for instance, estimates the maximum range of the liquid-fueled workhorse of the Iranian arsenal, the Shahab-3 medium-range missile, at 1,500 kilometers, while Missilethreat.com, a project of the conservative Claremont Institute, puts the maximum range at 2,500 kilometers. But beyond technical characteristics, experts are in general agreement on trends, especially regarding Iran's short- and medium-range systems. In November 2008, Iran allegedly tested a new multistaged solid-fuel missile, the Sajjil. Unlike the Shahab, its liquid-fueled predecessor, the Sajjil is easily transported and quickly readied for firing; it can be readied in minutes versus hours, estimates Charles P. Vick, a senior technical analyst with Globalsecurity.org. But Theodore Postol, an expert on Iranian missile systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says while development of the Sajjil advances the Iranian missile program (PDF), "it does not mark an immediate or dramatic shift in the nature of the potential missile threat from Iran."

"Iran has a demonstrated history of lying, misleading, and misinforming about their missile- and space-launch tests," he says. It's clear that they have done that in the past." -- Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service

Another milestone was reached in February 2009, when Iran successfully orbited its Omid satellite aboard a Safir rocket. While some analysts downplayed the launch's significance, Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the launch demonstrated a "fair amount of sophistication" for Iran, from mastery of multistage separation to use of various propulsion systems.

Other missiles and capabilities believed to be part of the Iranian arsenal include:

Short-range Ballistic Missiles (up to 1,000 kilometers). Iran's short-range arsenal includes the Fateh-110 and the Shahab-2 (also called the Scud-C), which Iran is believed to have purchased from North Korea (AP) in the 1990s. A third short-range missile, the CSS-8, is believed to have been acquired from China (Missilethreat.com). All of Iran's short-range missiles can be transported on mobile launchers, though the U.S. Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates Iran has less than one hundred (PDF) short-range delivery systems.

Medium- and Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles (between 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers). Before unveiling the Sajjil, Iran's primary medium-range missile was the Shahab-3 (FAS) and its several variants. The Shahab-3b has an estimated range of 2,500 kilometers, putting within range Israel, Turkey, and U.S. military bases in the Middle East. Testing of the Sajjil was seen as an important step forward in Iranian capabilities, principally the use of solid propellant technology.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) (more than 5,500 kilometers). Analysts are divided over Iran's long-range, or ICBM, ambitions. Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service says that in general, U.S. intelligence assessments are pushing the threat of an Iranian ICBM "further out in the decade," reflected in President Obama's decision to focus missile defense attention on Iran's short- and medium-range threats. In May 2009, a joint U.S.-Russia assessment by the EastWest Institute estimated Iran is six to eight years (PDF) away from producing a ballistic missile capable of delivering a 1,000 kilogram nuclear warhead to a range of 2,000 kilometers. But while organizations such as the Federation of American Scientists conclude that Iran began developing a long-range missile in the mid-1990s (the so-called Shahab-6), Hildreth and others say there is considerable doubt as to whether these programs remain active. An assessment of global ballistic missile threats produced by the U.S. Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center offers no specifics on an Iranian ICBM program, and only notes that the successful Safir multistage space launch "can serve as a test bed for long-range ballistic missile technologies."

Questionable Capabilities

For a decade U.S. intelligence agencies have predicted a looming Iranian missile threat (Globalsecurity.org) to the United States. In 1999 and again in 2001, intelligence experts put 2015 as a possible date for development of an Iranian ICBM. Coupled with the belief that Iran covets a nuclear weapon, this assessment has long driven U.S. interests in a workable missile defense system, at home and for Europe. Yet while many analysts say Iran is making incremental progress (BBC) toward a viable long-range missile program, there remains considerable dispute over what kinds of systems Iran possesses, how capable the systems are, and whether advancement is possible without significant foreign assistance. Hildreth says "there is little transparency in Iran's ballistic missile programs," making judgments difficult. Adding to the uncertainty, Hildreth says, are Tehran's frequent attempts at deception. "Iran has a demonstrated history of lying, misleading, and misinforming about their missile- and space-launch tests," he says. "It's clear that they have done that in the past." One blatant example involved altered photos (NYT) that emerged following a July 2008 Shahab-3 test launch; pictures released by Iranian news agencies showed more missiles than were actually fired during the exercise. Other examples include tests that may or may not have happened, or claims on range and capability that cannot be verified, experts say.

"Iran is now poised to project power globally. If alarm bells aren't yet ringing for the Obama administration, they should be." -- Uzi Rubin, former director of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
In shifting course on a planned missile shield for Europe, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates concluded that intelligence officials believe the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles "is developing more rapidly than previously projected," while "the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006." Some lawmakers, including the top Republican in the House Armed Services strategic subcommittee, Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), have challenged the Obama administration's analysis. But Philip E. Coyle, III, a missile expert and an assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, says that while Iran is making progress in its short- and medium-range capabilities, that technology is not transferrable to long-range systems. And he sees no evidence that Iran is working to change that. "I don't see them going to special materials, lighter-weight materials that they would need for an ICBM," Coyle says.

Help from Abroad

A number of analysts agree that Iran has received assistance from entities in Russia, China, and North Korea. Many assess that the Iranian Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong design, and Iran is believed to have modified this system further. Yet it's unclear whether support for Iran's missile program is officially sponsored, or funneled through illicit criminal networks. Hildreth says Iran's testing of the short-range Sajjil missile surprised a lot of people, and "seems to have been a leap in technology by as much as several generations. The question is, 'How did they do that?'" The assertion, of course, is that Iran received help from abroad, possibly from Russia (though most experts are loath to point fingers directly at Moscow). Postol, in his technical assessment of the Sajjil, notes that "is it almost certain" Iran was provided with "extensive technological help from abroad." He does not spell out possible acquisition scenarios, but instead suggests U.S.-Russia cooperation is vital to stop the transfer of missile technology.

Aside from bilateral cooperation, the United States could seek to broaden dual-use UN-type sanctions that were somewhat effective in halting Iraq's missile program under Saddam Hussein. Congress already authorizes penalties against Russian entities for transfers of missile technology to Iran. Additionally, the May 2009 joint threat assessment (PDF) by the EastWest Institute suggests both Russia and the United States should work to strengthen the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime. But Rubin, former head of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, points out, Iran's recent success--specifically its February 2009 space launch--suggest international efforts to control missile technology transfers are not working. "Iran is now poised to project power globally," Rubin writes. "If alarm bells aren't yet ringing for the Obama administration, they should be."

http://www.cfr.org/publication/20425/irans_ballistic_missile_program.html

Qassam · « **Reply #9 on:** October 16, 2009, 08:30:08 PM »

Quote from: Shirazi on October 04, 2009, 05:28:32 PM

I enjoy reading Uzi Rbuin's assessments of Iran's Missile program although he does try to stress the missiles (non existing) threat to europe.

Yeah I agree it was a good read. lol I usually do not read something that long but it was worth it. I'm surprised he gave Iran credit for their achievement.

sadeghi85 · « **Reply #10 on:** October 17, 2009, 10:15:08 AM »

Quote from: Qassam on October 16, 2009, 08:30:08 PM

Yeah I agree it was a good read. lol I usually do not read something that long but it was worth it. I'm surprised he gave Iran credit for their achievement.

Don't be surprised. He didn't give credit to anyone, He said so to scare Europeans. 'The Threat to Europe' !

Catsoo · « **Reply #11 on:** October 17, 2009, 02:39:00 PM »

The story behind the first Iranian Scud launch against Iraq in Iraq/Iran war (in Farsi).

http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8807250283

Catsoo

AminCo · « **Reply #12 on:** October 17, 2009, 04:03:43 PM »

Quote from: Catsoo on October 17, 2009, 02:39:00 PM

The story behind the first Iranian Scud launch against Iraq in Iraq/Iran war (in Farsi).

http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8807250283

Catsoo

thanks about this, It should be very interesting article.

Qassam · « **Reply #13 on:** October 17, 2009, 07:14:37 PM »

Quote from: sadeghi85 on October 17, 2009, 10:15:08 AM

Don't be surprised. He didn't give credit to anyone, He said so to scare Europeans. 'The Threat to Europe' !

I was talking about the usual BS that they say that missiles failed stuff like that. I know he was trying to scare Europe.

Catsoo · « **Reply #14 on:** December 18, 2009, 02:50:30 AM »

An interesting video of the Sejil-1 launch:


New leap in Iran's missile technology	Small \| Large

Catsoo

Catsoo · « **Reply #15 on:** December 18, 2009, 03:14:31 AM »

Sejjil

The Samen, Sejjil, and Ashura Iranian New Ballistic Missile Developments

© By Charles P. Vick (All Rights Reserved)

Senior Technical Analyst, Globalsecurity.org

12-16-09

The Sajjil [also known as "Sejjil" or "Sejil"] is a two-stage, primary solid-propellan with liquid propellant attitude control systems, surface-to-surface missile produced by Iran . The word is taken from a verse of Koran and it’s about a foreign army attacking Kaaba ( Mecca ). The story says that small birds appeared in the sky caring small pebbles of "baked clay" (SAJJIL) and dropped them on the enemy, killing them. Sajjil means stone mixed with mud. In Arabic, 'jim' is equivalent to 'ghaf' in Persian. Singue is hence spelled Sinj. The word Sajjil is then an Arabisation of a Persian term.

Sejjil two stage solid liquid propellant missile with a 2,000-2,510 kilometer range demonstrated

The Fars news agency reported 12 November 2008 that Iran had successfully test fired a new surface-to-surface missile. "The missile test launch is within the framework of defense strategy and conventional missile activities of Iran, it is merely intended for defense purposes and strengthening peace and stability in the region," Fars quoted Defense Minister Brigadier General Mustafa Mohammad Najjar as saying. "It will not be used against any country," he said. Najjar said the Sajjil missile's range is about 2,000-2,510 km (1,200-1,560 miles). He said the two-stage missile burns solid fuel. The flight was launched by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit as an operational system in a military exercise on November 10, 2008 from the newly excavated site on the outskirts of the city of Marivan in the western province of Kurdistan which borders Iraq. It is believed that the missile was fired intentionally into the Semnan range Dasht-e Kavir (Salt Desert ) and was therefore not launched full range. All subsequent flights have come from the Semnan range.

On 20 May 2009 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran had test-fired a new advanced missile with a range of about 1,200 miles, far enough to strike Israel and southeastern Europe . "Defense Minister (Mostafa Mohammad Najjar) has informed me that the Sajjil-2 missile, which has very advanced technology, was launched from Semnan and it landed precisely on the target," state radio quoted Ahmadinejad as saying.

Secretary Gates confirmed the Iranian test during an appearance before a House of Representatives committee. "The information that I have read indicates that it was a successful flight test," he said. "The missile will have a range of approximately 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers. Because of some of the problems they've had with their engines, we think, at least at this stage of the testing, it's probably closer to the lower end of that range. Whether it hit the target that it was intended for, I have not seen any information on that."

A subsequent successful test firing of the production prototype of Sejjil took place on Sept 28, 2009. It has been suggested that there have been at least four flight of the Sejjil solid propellant missile including at a minimum one in country unannounced. The have also been at least two firings of the longer range Ashura missile.

Iran followed this launch on December 16, 2009 from its Semnan range with an Iranian, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit army operation test launch of the land mobile fixed site green colored Sejjil-2 with warhead impact explosion of a none nuclear conventional explosion apparently being displayed. The Sejjil-2 has an demonstrated range capability of 2,510 kilometers with its 650 kilogram tri-conic warhead re-entry vehicle design. It can also carry a 1,000 kilogram wargead tp 2,000 kilometers.
Sejjil-1, Sejjil-2 Iranian Ballistic Missile

Sejjil-2, is a two stage solid propellant ballistic missile was flown on May 20, 2009 with an improved guidance package over that flown on the Sejjil-1. The 2,000-2,510 kilometer range Sejjil ballistic missile also utilizes liquid propellant stage, vehicle attitude control system. It is designed to replace the Shahab-3B, 3C and Shahab-3A series liquid propellant missile which takes hours to prepare for launch. Sejjil is a land mobile system which utilizes GPS capability to define its launch position on the earth. It can be prepared for launch in a matter of minutes. Sejjil is a part of a missile family that includes the Samen MRBM, the Sejjil 2,000 - 2510 km range missile and the Advanced Ashura 2,500-3,000 km range three solid propellant ballistic missile.
Sejjil-1 Iran Goes Operational with its Family of Solid Propellant Ballistic Missiles.

Iran made it official that as expected it has started the early deployment in 2008 of its operational solid propellant strategic ballistic missiles. The Samen/Ghadr-101 single stage missile with a 750-800 kilometer range was quietly recently paraded in Tehran , Iran on Sunday September 21, 2008 . The deployment also includes two variants of the Ghadr-110, 110A ballistic missile intended replacement for the Shahab-3A, 3B and 3C liquid propellant ballistic missiles with a 2,000 kilometer range. However the Ghadr-110/Sejjil (baked clay) two stage solid propellant missile flown on November 10, 2008 has a range of 2,000 to perhaps 2,500 kilometers but previously Iran has flight tested the Ghadr-110A Ashura three stage ballistic missile with a range capability of 2,500 to as much as 3,000 kilometers. This is depending on its warhead payload mass and staging configuration. The entire development flight tests of the Ghadr-101, 110, 110A series missiles has been carried out in country with little or no announcements until they have become operational if any announcement at all. At present it is apparent that the Ghadr-110/Sejjil is being deployed in its 2,000-2,510 kilometer range version with a 650-1,000 kg tri-conic warhead. That tri-conic "baby bottle nose" warhead and its dimensions fits in the same logistic envelop as the Shahab-3B, 3C series lands mobile TEL's. All of these solid propellant missiles use some liquid propellant systems for stage propulsion in flight attitude steering control in place of steering gimbals mounted nozzles.

This solid propellant ballistic missile series was developed and produced under the leadership of the Air and Space Organization (aerospace) Department of the Iranian, Ministry of Defense. Ghadr-110 systems heritage clearly has a link to the Pakistani Shaheen-II class system. The full heritage goes back to not merely China ’s M-18, DF-21 that in turn came from Republic of South Africa ’s RSA-2, RSA-3 strategic boosters SLV’s which Israel also benefited from. The flight was launched by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) unit as an operational system in a military exercise on November 10, 2008 from the newly excavated site on the outskirts of the city of Marivan in the western province of Kurdistan which borders Iraq . It is believed that the missile was fired intentionally into the Semnan range Dasht-e Kavir ( Salt Desert ) and was therefore not launched full range.

In classical Iranian fashion as aptly demonstrated the warhead exploded after covering 180 miles (~288 km) plus terminating the flight according to US Military Intelligence sources and methods as reported by the Associated Press. These Intelligence sources further suggested that the flight lasted only 9 seconds as it was reported or more likely 90 seconds but the reviewed videos clearly shows it went well beyond 35 seconds showing no anomalies. Newer video released from Iran on “Youtube” (


New leap in Iran's missile technology	Small \| Large

) also shows more details on the flight staging and liquid fueled APU power related system for the launch vehicle control and other details apparent from previous video’s released in Iran . Whether it intentionally veered off course or was programmed to accomplish this as it was reported will require a careful review of the telemetry captured by intelligence means from the full range observation. Based on this and other similar design related heritage systems performance data suggest that the Sejjil did indeed complete its two stage burn cycles successfully before exploding the warhead at altitude if that is what it was. That South African Republic and Pakistani, Chinese heritage related information says that the two stage burn was in the 107-121 seconds total with a slant angle performance of 272 kilometers while the Iran system using a smaller diameter solid motor was 180 miles (~288 km) plus down range well beyond the two stage burn cycle of the Sejjil missile system. If nothing else the explosion could have been nothing more than the second stage burn termination blowout port popping the top of the motor plate to kill the pressure during the warhead separation. If the motors are a little smaller in diameter as they seem to be 1.35 meters verses 1.4 meters the burns could have been a little shorter also. If it was an explosion it was after the end of the second stage burn if at all. By firing the missile the way it was apparently flown with an already proven warhead design flown over a range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers strongly suggest it was not intended to be a full range demonstration. All of these solid propellant missiles are believed to have been flight test demonstrated in the past in country with no fan fair. All of the pre-unannounced launches were apparently covered by U. S. , DSP satellite sensors and other technical means. Not all of the in country flights were successful which is to be expected. One example of this is the previous Ashura-110A experimental flight which is known to have been a partial failure but subsequent flights performed better. That means as Iran said Iran was successful with the launch. That was a very serious demonstration of a new operational strategic system that is a much more serious threat to the region under its range performance.

This and other ballistic missile tests by Iran have continued to violated UN Security Council resolution besides threatening other nations with in its range and reflect the end results of the illegal missile technology transfers from various nations such as Russia, China and the A. Q. Khan network to Iran. Historically no nation invests such large national treasury in over 1,000 kilometer range missiles to carry mere fire crack warheads and its companion nuclear technologies unless it is for nuclear weapons development, manufacture, and deployment of the weapons delivery systems.

The advanced nature of the system comes from the fact that the warning time for these missiles has been greatly reduced to mere minutes from that available through the existing liquid propellant Shahab-3 series of hours in preparation. This constitutes a major strategic threat to the regions with its range performance capability. This says nothing of the known to be deployed liquid propellant 4,000 kilometer range No-dong-B never displayed or paraded by Iran . No-dong-B is deployed both in Iran and North Korea .
References,

1. Ali Akbar Dareini Tehran, Iran & Matthew Lee , Pam Hess, Washington, USA, Iran tests missile - Israel in easy reach, Associated Press, November 12, 2008, PP. 1-2.
2. Thanks to John Locker for video monitoring and Nicholas Badenhorst for technical assistance
3. Iran's Sejil missile "threatens Europe", Tel Aviv, Israel (UPI) Aug. 25, 2009 p.1-2

Iran latest ballistic missile and space boosters Sejjil TEL

Sejjil/GHADR-110
Range    Kilometers    2,000-2,500
Diameter    Meters    ~1.4
Height    Meters    ~17.5-19
Stages         2
Launch Mass    Kilograms    25,000+
Warhead Mass    Kilograms    1,158-1,1050-760-550
Chinese Origin    Heritage    M-18 missile

Questions on Solid Motor Technology from Iran to North Korea

Iranian transfer of it advanced solid propellant technology to North Korea is a serious concern along with what it has already received from Russia that does not stand up when considering the understood state of North Korea's solid propellant ballistic missile program even if they are benefiting from Iran's extensive efforts in that area of ballistic missile technology development.

Iran is also in the advanced stage of developing a series of solid propellant ballistic missile, and potential space boosters as compared to known equivalent systems of Pakistan , U.S and Russia .

US GOVERNMENT FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THE NEW

NORTH KOREAN & IRANIAN MISSILES

By Charles P. Vick © All Rights Reserved 2007

Senior Analyst, Globalsecurity.org

Finally on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C. Marshall Institute. In that speech he described the Iranian multi stage Ghadr-101 with a 750-800-1000 km range and the two-three stage Ghadr-110 (Ashura) solid propellant missile with a range of (1,324 miles) 1,995.16 or close to 2,000 kilometers. It has been known that the Iranians are working on the Ghadr-101 as well as the Ghadr-110 (Ashura) solid propellant missiles. The Ghadr-101, 110 solid motor development was completed in 2005. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 200-250 kg warhead. He went further in his slides presentation to show that the liquid propellant No-dong-B/Mirim has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. (24) The No-dong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. The Iranian Ghadr-101, 110, 110A will in fact also provides Iran with an ASAT capability besides its operational MRBM and IRBM capability.
References:

1. Pamela Hess , North Korea has second long-range missile site, Associated Press, Sept. 10, 2008 pp. 1-3.

2. North Korea has second long-range missile launch site: analyst, AFP Washington, Sept. 19, 2008 p.1.

3. Jane's Defense Weekly Uncovers North Korea 's New Missile Facility,,Media Release, Sept. 11, 2008 , p. 1-3.

4. N. Korea Building New Missile Base, http://english.chosun.con, Chosun ilbo (english edition) Sept. 12, 2008 , p. 1.

5. New North Korean Missile Site Revealed, http://english.chosun.com (english edition), Sept. 12, 2008 , p. 1-2.

6. N. Korea Tests Missile Ignition, http://english.chosun.com, Chosun ilbo English edition, Sept 16, 2008 , p.1.

7. North Korea tests missile engine, http://www. presstv.ir (PRESSTV of Iran) Sept 16, 2008 , p. 1.

8. N. Korea Developing Long Range Missile Thrusters At New Launch Site: Source," South Korean Yonhap news agency report, Sept. 16, 2008 , p. 1-2.

9. Kim Kwi-Ku"n:"What Is the Missile Base in North Korea's Tongch"ang-ri for?-"likelihood of Launch Artificial Satellite - Relation to Nuclear Weapons Delivery Means"", South Korean Yonhap news agency report, Sept. 14, 2008, p. 1-2.

10. Google Earth imagery

11. N Korea conducts engine test at new missile site: report AFP, http://www.spacewars.com , Seoul , September 16-17, 2008 , p. 1-2.

12. Pamela Hess , US : North Korea conducts missile engine test, Associated Press, September 16, 2008 , p. 1-2.

13. Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, North Korea Said to Have Tested Missile Engine, http://www. nytimes.com , Sept. 16, 2006 , Sept 17, 2008 , p. 1-2.

14. Blaine Harden , North Korea Tests Engine of Long-Range Missile, Report Says, The Washington Post Foreign Service, Sept. 17, 2008 p. A-12.

15. Kurt Achin, Seoul, South Korea, New North Korean Missile Site Revealed, Voice of America, Sept 11, 2008 pp. 1-2.

16. Iranian military parade photographs of the FARS News Agency of September 21, 2008 .

17. N Korea may already have nuclear warheads: ex-CIA official, Staff Writer, Tokyo , Japan , AFP, http://www.spacewar,com, September 26, 2008 , pp. 1-2.

18. N. Korea unlikely to possess nuclear weapons: military chief, Yonhap news agency, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2008/10/08/0401000000AEN20081008008800315.HTML October 8 , 2008, pp. 1.

19. Intelligence: N. Korea to Test New Missile, The Dong-A Ilbo, http://english.donga.com , October 2, 2008 pp. 1 -2.

24. http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htm Gertz, Bill, How the “axis” seeks the killer missile, The Washington Times, January 30, 2007 , p. ?

25. http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htmGertz, Bill, How the “axis” seeks the killer missile, The Washington Times, January 30, 2007

26. N Korean base could handle longer-range missiles: S Korea minister, Spacewars.com, Seoul AFP, Nov 4, 2008 , pp. 1-2l.

27. A Korea : N Koreas building base for bigger missiles, Seoul , South Korea , AP, Nov. 5, 2008 , p.1.

28. Iran "fires second space rocket", http://news.bbc.co.uk , BBC, 15:50 GMT November 26, 2008 , pp. 1-2.

29. Iran To Send Animals Into Space, Tehran, Iran RIA Novosti, http://www.space-treael.com/reports/Iran_To_Send_Animals_Into_Space_999.html, Dec 03, 2008, p.1.

30. N. Korea Could Export ICBM Capability To Iran, Middle East Newsline , Washington , Dec. 24, 2008 p.1 http://www.menewsline.com

31. Iran Builds First Satellite Ground Station, Middle East Newsline, Nicosia , January 14, 2009 , p.1

32. Iran Begins Extended Shihab-3 Missile Output, Middle East Newsline, Nicosia , December 10, 2009 , p.1.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/sajjil.htm

Catsoo

Catsoo · « **Reply #16 on:** January 09, 2010, 01:26:17 AM »

Do you know German?

Here is a report on Sejil analysis in German:

http://www.airpower.at/news09/0812_israel-iran/nachtrag_sejil.htm

Catsoo

maiser · « **Reply #17 on:** January 09, 2010, 11:16:27 AM »

Quote from: Qassam on October 17, 2009, 07:14:37 PM

I was talking about the usual BS that they say that missiles failed stuff like that. I know he was trying to scare Europe.

Zionists are never positive towards their enemies. Either you hear them talk about the failing of their achievements, or they do another trick and talk about how dangerous the achievement is becoming as a propaganda tool. Fortunately some of these propaganda technique's work both ways, since it also scares the brainwashed public from wanting to confront Iran.

Kabbalah · « **Reply #18 on:** January 09, 2010, 03:48:48 PM »

Quote from: Catsoo on January 09, 2010, 01:26:17 AM

Do you know German?

Here is a report on Sejil analysis in German:

http://www.airpower.at/news09/0812_israel-iran/nachtrag_sejil.htm

Catsoo

They quoted the opinions of Uzi Rubin and MIT-Prof. Theodore Postol , which are on opposite points in how danger and powerful Seijil is.
The article says that for first time Iran has a 2stage rocket , which both 2 stages are fueled with hard fuel..
Wenn the take off got place from north-west corner of Iran , the rocket is capable to hit targets in Greece, Romania,
east Poland, even parts of Hungary and Slovakia.....
Rubin thinks that with a little improvements Iran would be capable to upgrade Seijil up to rocket with around 4000 km
range and common weight 40 tons..... and so on
BTW very interesting site, Catsoo

Ayyash · « **Reply #19 on:** January 20, 2010, 01:22:45 PM »

Does anyone have any idea what the numbers on the side of the Shahab-3 mean?

So far i've found

TK3.0013 (3A)
WX.30021 (3A)
WX.30022 (3A)
UCGF054 (3B)
EV3.E003 (3B)
WX3.0022 (3B)

Best i can figure is some sort of serial number, but the pattern in different.

Pasdar · « **Reply #20 on:** January 20, 2010, 07:44:49 PM »

Those numbers seem random because of the different structures.

Ayyash · « **Reply #21 on:** January 20, 2010, 09:16:47 PM »

Quote from: Pasdar on January 20, 2010, 07:44:49 PM

Those numbers seem random because of the different structures.

That's what it seems like, but logically, why would they print random number sequences on missiles?

Pasdar · « **Reply #22 on:** January 20, 2010, 09:31:26 PM »

I meant unstandardized numbers, not that those were meaningless random numbers. They must mean something, but since they don't seem to follow any kind of convention, it changes each time according to what they want it to represent. At least, that is what I think.

Lur · « **Reply #23 on:** January 21, 2010, 03:43:53 AM »

could be for the facility that the missile was built the letters on the missiles or for the sites where their stationed but I'm just guessing

Catsoo · « **Reply #24 on:** February 08, 2010, 09:07:37 PM »

Ameikaza,

You are posting stuff in unrelated threads. This thread is dedicated to SSMs and not any other typr of a missile! I am going to delee your last post about anti tank missiles.

Catsoo