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Offline Nazer

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How to Engage Iran
« on: February 17, 2012, 04:44:21 PM »
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February 9, 2012

SNAPSHOT

How to Engage Iran


What Went Wrong Last Time — And How to Fix It
Hossein Mousavian
HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN is an associate research scholar at Princeton University and former spokesman for Iran's nuclear file.

Members of the Iranian air force re-enact Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's arrival to Iran in 1979. (Courtesy Reuters)
 
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, two major schools of thought have influenced Iran's foreign policy toward the United States. The first maintains that Iran and the United States can reach a compromise based on mutual respect, noninterference in domestic affairs, and the advancement of shared interests. Those who hold this view acknowledge the animosity and historical grievances between the two countries but argue that it is possible to normalize their relations. The second school is more pessimistic. It deeply distrusts the United States and believes that Washington is neither ready nor committed to solving the disputes between the two countries.

Having worked within the Iranian government for nearly 30 years, and having sat on the secretariat of Iran's Supreme National Security Council for much of the decade before 2005, I was involved in discussions about both of these two approaches. My first personal experience in these matters dates to the late 1980s, when the critical issue facing the United States and Europe was the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. During that period, Iran received dozens of messages from Washington proposing that each side, echoing U.S. President George H. W. Bush's 1989 inaugural address, show "goodwill for goodwill."
 
That year, Bush offered then Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani a deal: If Iran assisted in securing the release of U.S. and Western hostages in Lebanon, the United States would respond with a gesture of its own. In response, Tehran emphasized its expectation that the United States would unfreeze and return billions of dollars in Iranian assets that were being held in the United States. The Iranian leadership also came away from discussions believing that Israel would reciprocate by releasing some Lebanese hostages, specifically Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the leader of Hezbollah.
 
Then the two schools of thought came into play. Rafsanjani believed that this deal could be a confidence-building measure that would lead to rapprochement with the United States. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, warned against trusting the United States and thought it naive to expect Washington to repay Tehran's efforts in kind. Then, as now, he believes that the United States is after nothing less in Iran than regime change. Ultimately, Iran decided to play a key role in securing the release of all Western hostages in Lebanon. But the United States neither released Iranian assets nor facilitated the release of Lebanese hostages.
 
Despite the affront, in subsequent years, Ayatollah Khamenei did not prevent Rafsanjani or, later, President Muhammad Khatami, from making more overtures to the West. In 1997, for example, Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, an agreement to decommission all chemical weapons by 2012. The same year, it also joined the Biological Weapons Convention. After 2001, Iran helped the United States oust the Taliban from much of Afghanistan, and for 20 consecutive months, between 2003 and 2005, it cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency. As the IAEA requested, the government opened various military facilities to inspections, suspended its enrichment activities, and implemented the Additional Protocol.

Although Iran expected that these gestures would open the way for it to continue a nuclear program (which it is authorized to do as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), the United States and the West simply developed a new set of complaints against Iran. These included questions about Iran's nuclear-related program, its intentions toward Israel, and its hostility toward the U.S. military role in the region, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than reward Iran for cooperation, the United States implemented new sanctions and worked to increase international pressure on Tehran.
 
Ayatollah Khamenei was not surprised by Washington's behavior. Throughout this time, he routinely rejected direct talks with the United States aimed at a rapprochement. He argued that the United States wanted to negotiate from a position of strength; accordingly, it employed intimidation, pressure, and sanctions to bully Iran into submission. The West's increasingly hostile reactions to what Iran's leaders believed were moderate policies eventually gave the radicals the upper hand in domestic policies. And that ultimately led to the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Looking back, it is difficult to list all of the steps that each side might have taken to reverse the downward spiral in relations that followed. Certainly, the West, the United States in particular, missed great opportunities during the moderate presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami. More certainly, both sides would have needed a stronger commitment to changing the direction of U.S.-Iran relations.
 
U.S. President Barack Obama's inauguration offered an opportunity for a new beginning. And once in office, he immediately signaled his willingness to enter into a dialogue with the Islamic Republic on a wide range of issues, aiming to remove 30 years of hostilities and create "constructive ties" between the two countries. In my view, even though the Iranian leadership was still skeptical about Obama's ability to break many long-standing U.S. policies, it believed in his personal intentions. For that reason, Iran's leaders decided to test the possibility of a breakthrough by granting a freer hand to Ahmadinejad in managing the relationship with Washington.
 
To be sure, much of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric about the relationship was harsh. But Iran made some unprecedented overtures as well. As Mohamed El Baradei, the former director of the IAEA, revealed in his memoir, Ahmadinejad sent a message in 2009 through him offering Obama a grand bargain. According to El Baradei, the Iranian president expressed a desire for direct talks with the United States, which would lead to bilateral negotiations, without preconditions. The talks would be held on the basis of mutual respect, and Iran would agree to help the United States in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Obama did not respond.
 
Almost all Westerners blame Tehran for the decline in relations since. They point to the failure of an initiative to swap Iran's highly enriched uranium for less-enriched fuel rods, which Russia and the United States proposed in Geneva in October 2009. A short time after that meeting, the Iranian government told El Baradei that Tehran would be willing to make the deal directly with the United States. Washington rejected the offer. Iran subsequently signed a similar agreement with Brazil and Turkey. That could have been an important confidence-building measure, but the United States rejected it, too.
 
In December 2010, the United States demonstrated for the first time a readiness to recognize Iran's legitimate right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. In an interview [1] with the BBC, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that Iran could enrich uranium once it demonstrated that it could do so in a responsible manner in accordance with its international obligations. In response, Iran made new overtures toward the United States. A reliable source told me that, during a February 2011 conference in Sweden, Iran's deputy foreign minister extended an official invitation to Marc Grossman, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to visit Iran for talks on cooperation in Afghanistan. Washington dismissed the offer.

Then, in October 2011, Iran invited an IAEA team, led by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts, to visit the research-and- development sections of its heavy-water and centrifuge facilities. A contact told me that during the visit, Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, offered a blank check to the IAEA, granting full transparency, openness to inspections, and cooperation with the IAEA. He also informed [2] Nackaerts of Iran's receptiveness to putting the country's nuclear program under "full IAEA supervision," including implementing the Additional Protocol for five years, provided that sanctions against Iran were lifted.
 
Trying to make Iran's good intentions clearer, during a trip to New York in September 2011, Ahmadinejad announced that two American hikers who were being held in Iranian custody would be released. He signaled Iran's readiness to stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent if the United States gave the country fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor in return. This was an immensely important move to satisfy some of the West's demands and demonstrate that Iran is not seeking highly enriched uranium.
 
But the United States responded negatively again. Washington accused Tehran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. It also influenced [3] the substance and tone of the IAEA's November report on Iran by adding accusations of possible military dimensions to the country's nuclear program. Last month, Washington sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran; in effect, placed an oil embargo on the country; sponsored a UN resolution against Iran on terrorism; and orchestrated a UN resolution condemning Iran on human rights.
 
Explaining his Iran policy in New York in January, Obama proudly announced that he had mobilized the world and built an "unprecedented" sanctions regime targeting Iran. Obama said U.S.-led sanctions had reduced Iran's economy to "shambles [4]." Three short years after the Obama administration introduced an engagement policy, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta named Iran a "pariah state," reminding many of the previous administration's branding of Iran as part of the "axis of evil." Panetta noted [5] that he hoped Obama's new policy would weaken the regime so that "they have to make a decision about whether they continue to be a pariah or whether they decide to join the international community."
 
These statements are clear evidence that Obama's engagement policy has failed. In fact, they support Ayatollah Khamenei's assessment that the core goal of U.S. policy is regime change. The door to rapprochement is closing. To keep it from slamming shut, the United States should declare, without condition, that it does not seek regime change in Tehran. Beyond that, the recognition of several principles is essential to bettering U.S.-Iranian relations after more than 30 bad years. For starters, both governments should practice patience and try to show mutual goodwill.
 
For one, both the United States and Iran are eager to understand the other's end game. Together, the two countries should draft a "grand agenda," which would include nuclear and all other bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed; outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side can gain by achieving it.
 
The United States and Iran should also work together on establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban's full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq; creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability; cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by strengthening the ties between their people through tourism, promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.
 
It would be misguided for the United States to count on exploiting possible cleavages within the Iranian leadership. Iran's prominent politicians have their differences -- like those in all countries -- but they will be united against foreign interference and aggression. Both capitals should also progressively reduce threat-making, hostile behavior, and punitive measures during engagement to prove that they seek a healthier relationship. Engagement policy should be accompanied by actual positive actions, not just words.
 
I know enough about the dangers involved in the current direction of U.S. and Iranian policies to believe that change is essential. There is a peaceful path -- one that will satisfy both Iranian and U.S. objectives while respecting Iran's legitimate nuclear rights. Washington and Tehran must find that right path together, and, despite what passes for debate in the international arena today, I believe they can.
 

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Links:
[1] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/12/152339.htm
 [2] http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2011/11/mousavian-interview-on-irans-nuclear-program.html?cid=6a00d83420523653ef01675f035ecb970b
 [3] http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-11/10/c_122258400.htm
 [4] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gBxDdCgwUv8X2qbVyAQNwWAlP6rg?docId=CNG.88737ace4800efd85d9752c4c64d58bb.f1
 [5] http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4937



http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137095/hossein-mousavian/how-to-engage-iran

Offline Nazer

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US, Iran inching toward talks
« Reply #1 on: February 17, 2012, 04:47:28 PM »
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US, Iran inching toward talks
By M K Bhadrakumar

The foreplay is nearing completion on the Iran situation. The surest sign is that there were no serious takers in Western capitals for the Israeli smear campaign this week that Tehran's agents had been going about placing bombs in New Delhi, Tbilisi and Bangkok. Simply put, there is growing impatience that it is way past the time for histrionics.

Several indicators are available that matters are moving towards a substantive plane. One cluster of events this week consists of the Iranian reply to the letter from the European Union foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, penned by Tehran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili. Simultaneously, Tehran announced it was developing a new generation of centrifuges and augmenting its number of centrifuges from 6,000 to 9,000 as well as loading a research

Dilbert 

reactor with Iran's first batch of domestically produced fuel.

While Tehran's announcement of new nuclear "achievements" might have appeared as a belligerent move - Washington derided it as "hype" meant for the domestic audience in Iran - the contents of Jalili's letter, and, more important, the initial responses of cautious optimism it generated within hours in Western capitals convey that there are positive stirrings in the air.
The reaction in Washington is particularly noteworthy. A White House official was quoted as saying, "It [Jalili's letter] could lead to further diplomacy, provided that they [Iranians] are serious about it. We have made clear that this has to be a dialogue about their nuclear program specifically."

Jalili's letter apparently said Tehran would have "new initiatives" and indicated Iran's openness to discussing the nuclear issue. It suggested that "[A] constructive and positive attitude toward the Islamic Republic of Iran's new initiatives in this round of talks could open a positive perspective for our negotiation".

Jalili concluded, "Therefore ... I propose to resume out talks in order to take fundamental steps for sustainable cooperation in the earliest possibility in a mutually agreed venue and time." Significantly, neither Ashton nor Jalili raised any pre-conditions for the talks. Quite obviously, Brussels has already begun consultations with Washington on setting the date and venue for the resumption of talks between the "Iran Six" and Iran after a gap of three years. The "Iran Six" - also known as the "P5+1", includes the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the US, France, China, Russia, Britain - plus Germany.

A second cluster of positive signs is the virtual toning down of rhetoric on both sides. The most significant contribution to an easing of tensions came from senior American intelligence officials in the course of a US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Thursday - within a day of receiving Jalili's letter. It is interesting that the hearing itself came on the heels of a bipartisan draft resolution being mooted by 32 senators "ruling out a strategy of containment for a nuclear-armed Iran".

James Clapper, the US director of national intelligence, assessed that as of now, Tehran has not decided whether to build a nuclear weapon, although it has been acquiring some skills. He doubted whether Iran would really take the plunge, either:
We [US] believe that the decision would be made by the Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] himself and he would base that decision on a cost-benefit analysis. I don't think he'd want a nuclear weapon at any price, so that I think plays to the value of sanctions. They are keeping themselves in a position to make that decision, but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time.
Conceivably, Clapper was also acknowledging Washington's appreciation of the self-restraint Tehran has been showing in not optimally pursing its nuclear program. In parallel testimony, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, added that "Iran today has the technical, scientific and industrial capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons" and notwithstanding the international pressure through sanctions "we assess that Tehran is not close to agreeing to abandon its nuclear program".

Putting both testimonies together, the Barack Obama administration has unambiguously indicated that the time is most opportune to engage Tehran in talks. Both Clapper and Burgess downplayed the prospect of Iran posing security threats to the US or to the Strait of Hormuz.

A fascinating aspect of the testimony was that the US officials virtually admitted that Tehran was on the whole being reactive rather than being provocative or belligerent in ratcheting up tensions. Burgess went to the extent of saying Iran could be expected to respond if attacked, but that in the US estimation it was unlikely to start any military conflict on its own.

Clapper went a step further, directly linking any shifts in Tehran's peaceful nuclear program to an eventuality where "the [Iranian] regime feels threatened in terms of its stability and tenure". Clapper also agreed with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta that at any rate, producing a bomb "would probably take them [Iranians] about a year, and then possibly another one or two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort".

Clapper added, "It's technically feasible [making a bomb] but practically not likely. There are all kinds of combinations and permutations that would affect how long it might take, should the Iranians make a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon." In sum, Clapper poured cold water on the Israeli scenario of "apocalypse now". (He also repeated that Israel was not planning to attack Iran.)

On the whole, these testimonies must be seen as a comprehensive assurance being held out to Tehran that there are, after all, enough folks in Washington who haven't lost their sanity through all these months of shadow-boxing and grandstanding in the US-Iran standoff.

Alongside, in a third cluster, Tehran, too, has resorted to a bit of public diplomacy to project its interest in constructively engaging the US. Prominent among these have been three articles penned by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who held a key position in Iran's nuclear negotiating team until six years ago (besides serving as Iran's ambassador to Germany for seven years.)

His opening article was featured in the influential US magazine Foreign Affairs. Mousavian looked back at the US-Iran standoff on the nuclear issue over the past eight years as a chronicle of wasted time, of missed opportunities and misunderstandings and mutual misconceptions feeding on each other with both sides resorting to miscalculations that ultimately didn't help matters, leave alone end the stalemate.

He placed the blame squarely on successive US administrations for not having cared to explore repeated Iranian overtures for a normalization of relations.

His refrain throughout has been that the nuclear issue should never have been regarded as a "stand-alone" question that could be dealt with separately from the larger issues of the confrontational relationship that the two countries have had since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

As he put it, "There won't be a solution to the nuclear dispute as long as officials in Tehran and Washington continue to base their relationship on escalating hostility, threats and mistrust, particularly if the ultimate US goal is regime change." (By an interesting coincidence, this was also the grain of what Panetta and Clapper said this week.)

In his latest and concluding third part, Mousavian suggested the "bottom lines" in the upcoming negotiations: "For Iran, this means the ability to produce reliable civilian energy, as it is entitled to do under [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty. For the US and Europe, it means never having Iran develop nuclear weapons or a short-notice breakout capability."

How are the expectations of the two sides to be harmonized? Mousavian has the following to say:
Specifically, the West should recognize the legitimate right of Iran to produce nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment; remove sanctions; and normalize Iran's nuclear file at the UN Security Council and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. To meet the P5+1 conditions, Iran should accept the maximum level of transparency by implementing the IAEA's Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty's Additional Protocol, which broadly enable intrusive monitoring and inspections of nuclear facilities.

To eliminate Western concerns about a possible nuclear weapons breakout using low-enriched uranium, any deal should place a limit on Iran's enrichment activities to less than 5 percent ... A deal should also cap the amount of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride that Iran can stockpile; limit its enrichment sites during a period of confidence building; establish an international consortium on enrichment in Iran; and commit not to reprocess low-enriched uranium during the confidence-building period.
The "Mousavian suggestion" is somewhat modeled on Russia's "step-by-step" plan that also includes full supervision by the IAEA; implementation of the Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement between the IAEA and Iran; limiting enrichment sites to one; and temporary suspension of enrichment.

Moscow proposed that in return, Iran would expect the "Iran Six" to remove sanctions and normalize Iran's nuclear file in the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council.

To what extent Mousavian's opinions reflect the thinking within the Iranian government is hard to tell and indeed he is conscious that the "domestic political climate in both countries" has come in the way of meaningful negotiations between Washington and Tehran in the past.

But what is striking is that the testimonies by Clapper and Burgess are in broad harmony with what Mousavian has suggested as the way forward.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB18Ak02.html

 

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