Iran Military Forum

For those who don't know or may have forgotten this fact in this blizzard of misinformation, getting to 3.5% enrichment is BY FAR the most difficult step.  Due to the nature of the enrichment process, further purification becomes somewhere between geometrically and exponentially easier.  This is counter-intuitive but it is correct.  Keep this in mind when thinking about the stance of the two sides and the pertinent negotiation strategies of each.  Here's a reference link below (with further references included within):

http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/military-discussions-and-news/nuclear-energy-nuclear-bombs-next/msg14212/#msg14212

I post this interesting fact every now and then as a reminder for everyone to build it into their calculations. The West's pre-occupation with 20% enriched U is a red herring.  Iran, for all practical purposes, is only a command away from 90% HEU.

Mamdali

Indeed, many here either don't about this, or completely ignore it.

From all accounts Iran's nuclear program is a red herring all together, for the problem they have with Iran is not nuclear weapons or 20% or 90% enriched uranium. It's the fear they have in their hearts of an Islamic Republic which will be even stronger than before now that it has it's natural allies Iraq/Afghanistan/Lebanon/Syria in its sphere of influence.

These negotiations are just for politics, nothing substantial. The west want's to say we tried our best to their domestic public, we negotiated but they did not accept, while Iran has offered to give up 20% enrichment for removal of sanctions. Iranian officials understand that the west is hell bent on regime change, espionage, assassinations and continuation of their anti-Iran policies.

The west wants Iran to halt enrichment, ship their enriched Uranium out, for medical isotopes. What kind of deal is that? It's a joke! If the west removes all sanctions, what happens then? The Iranian economy booms and this would mean complete defeat and an Iran which will be more powerful and want compensation for 30 years of aggression against it.

What Happens after Baghdad Talks: Scenarios and Solutions

By Dr. Ali Abdullah-Khani, President of Tehran International Studies & Research Institute (TISRI)
Source: Iran Review

The latest two rounds of negotiations between Iran and the group P5+1, known as Istanbul 2 and Baghdad talks, have provided a good ground for speculations about goals and objectives of the United States and its European allies. The following pessimistic and optimistic scenarios can be considered in this regard.

1. The United States is looking for an ethical justification for the escalation of its hostile measures against Iran in the future. Therefore, by engaging in a few rounds of talks with Tehran, Washington aims to tell the world that negotiations have failed due to Iran's lack of cooperation and, as such, the United States has no other choice, but to launch a military attack on Iran or take another similar step. This situation will help the United States to provide ethical immunity for the unconventional measures which it is contemplating to take against Iran in the future.

2. After Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, wrote a letter to his counterpart, Ms. Catherine Ashton, announcing Iran's readiness to talk about its nuclear capabilities, the United States has come to believe that Iran is ready to give up its nuclear energy program due to certain reasons, including tough international sanctions. Therefore, the United States and its European allies believe that negotiations are a means of finding a way for Iran to submit (not a means of cornering Iran). Therefore, by putting total suspension of 20-percent uranium enrichment and also by focusing on Fordow nuclear site, they are apparently trying to widen the time interval that Iran needs to achieve the capability to build nuclear weapons.

3. It will take some time before tough sanctions that the United States and its European allies have imposed on Iran in the past six months will start to have an effect. Meanwhile, Israel’s hurry to engage in military confrontation with Iran and Islamic Republic’s possible angry reaction to it may draw the United States into the vortex of a new conflict for which the US is not ready in view of its domestic conditions (such as the forthcoming presidential elections and the West’s financial crisis). On the other hand, regional conditions (including the wave of awakening in Arab nations and the transitional situation in the Middle East) are not suitable for such a military faceoff. As a result, negotiations with Iran provide the United States with an opportunity to buy time until the full sting of sanctions is felt in Iran, gain more internal preparedness, and strengthen its grip on the situation in the Middle East. The bottom line is that the United States believes international sanctions will start to show their impact on Iran in the coming year and Iran will give up under their pressure. Otherwise, they argue, domestic US conditions and regional circumstances will further improve in order to provide an opportunity for the United States to act under more favorable conditions.

4. After necessary assessments, especially by analyzing the final impact of recently increased political and economic pressures on Iran which have at times brought both sides to the brink of an all-out war, the United States has reached the conclusion that its win (for US) - lose (submission of Iran) game or all (for the US) - none (for Iran) strategy which have been pursued in the past decade were, in fact, the main catalysts which prompted Iran to increase its centrifuges from 800 to 8,000 and its level of enrichment from 3.5 percent to 20 percent. In addition, they have come to realize that possible failure of the current policy (of exerting political and economic pressure on Iran) and reaching the stage of military confrontation with Iran will not necessarily cause Tehran to give up its nuclear energy program. On the opposite, it may be the outset of a complicated conflict which may rapidly get out of hand and have unpredictable consequences for all involved parties with the least achievements. In this way, all involved parties will be losers of such a military confrontation. Just imagine that the beginning of war with Iran will be rapidly followed by Iran's decision to stop all cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to the existing legal rules, Tehran will be then entitled to forget about its obligations for pursuing a peaceful nuclear energy program; stray missiles will start to hit oil production centers, reserves, and pipeline through the Persian Gulf region and global oil prices will skyrocket as a result of those attacks. On the other hand, bombardment of Iran will marginalize moderate policies and politicians in the country’s political scene for a long time to come while hatred toward the United States and attacks against its interests through the world will become rule of the day.

Moreover, other parties, including Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the whole Arab states around the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean will get involved in the war. As a result, the war on Iran will rapidly evolve into a full-blown regional (or even globalized) war in the Middle East, which in turn, increases chances of more transregional war as a result of international focus on the Persian Gulf conflict. All these facts can make the US government reach the conclusion that it really needs a more realistic approach based on a more different game.

5. Certain indications from the US President Barack Obama in recent weeks are telltale signs of his effort at being serious about nuclear negotiations and his acceptance of a win-win strategy on Iran. Those indications include the idea of differentiating between nuclear capability and building nuclear weapons; attention to a recent fatwa (religious edict) by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei that building nuclear weapons is haram (forbidden) in Islam; and emphasis on Iran's nuclear rights as opposed to its obligations (on May 19, 2012 and before G8 meeting) as a confidence building measure which can facilitate verification of non-diversion in Iran's nuclear program toward military purposes.

For two reasons; firstly, the historical backgrounds, and secondly, realities on the ground, the first three scenarios seem to be more realistic. According to historical backgrounds, all positions and measures taken by the United States on Iran during the past 33 years have been hostile and accompanied with cheating and deception. Therefore, we can count on the said historical backgrounds in this case as well.

On the other hand, such measures as passing another bill for the intensification of anti-Iranian sanctions by the US Senate on May 21, 2012; low level of the P5+1 negotiating team in Istanbul 2 and Baghdad talks and their resultant inability to discuss serious issues and make strategic decisions; as well as offering commonplace and totally personal proposals by Ms. Ashton in Baghdad talks such as proposing plane parts in return for the suspension of 20-percent uranium enrichment, were all indicative that the negotiations are just another hoax within the framework of all (for US) - none (for Iran), or win (for US) - lose (for Iran) strategy.

Despite the above facts, I think when President Obama, as commander in chief of the armed forces and the highest ranking official in charge of the national security of a global power, talks about differentiation between nuclear capability and nuclear weapons in his address to AIPAC meeting and elsewhere, and when, before Baghdad negotiations, he clearly talks about Iran's nuclear rights as opposed to its nuclear obligations, he should be taken seriously. This is especially true about Iran's nuclear case which has turned into one of the most important international cases. Therefore, I think that the Islamic Republic should engage seriously in new talks in order to prove to the world that despite realities on the ground and the aforesaid historical backgrounds, it is ready to prove its goodwill. Therefore, and assuming that the fifth or at least the fourth scenario will form the basis of negotiations, I am willing to propose the following measures.

1. Both sides agree that as long as negotiations continue, they should avoid of provocative measures against each other. This means that Iran should clearly stop developing its nuclear installations and equipment while the P5+1 should accept to avoid adopting new resolutions and issuing provocative statements, especially on the suspension of uranium enrichment by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should also avoid passing new sanctions with respect to Iran's nuclear energy program.

2. During the upcoming Moscow negotiations, the P5+1 should emphasize on Iran's nuclear rights, as stipulated by President Obama, and unequivocally recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium up to 5 percent in its own facilities. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in return, should issue an official statement following Moscow talks in which Tehran will declare its readiness to stop 20-percent uranium enrichment.

3. The main concern of the United States is to prevent Iran's achievement of nuclear weapons and the most important problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran is to have its nuclear rights recognized within framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, the two sides better prepare a package on the best way for preventing diversion in Iran's nuclear program toward military purposes under supervision of the United States and two impartial representatives chosen by Iran. In this way, the package can be discussed and approved in the fourth round of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. On the other hand, Iran can propose a package on its nuclear rights in cooperation with two impartial representatives appointed by the United States for further discussion and approval in the fourth round of talks between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the group P5+1. Obviously, proposals for preparing both packages should be raised during the third and upcoming round of negotiations in Moscow.

http://www.****.***/news/12/jun/1018.html

U.N. nuclear watchdog, Iran fail to reach deal on probe

Iran - VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog and Iran failed at talks on Friday to unblock a probe into suspected atom bomb research by the Islamic state, a setback dimming any chances for success in higher-level negotiations between Tehran and major powers later this month.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency, using unusually pointed language, said no progress had been made in the meeting aimed at sealing a deal on resuming the IAEA's long-stalled investigation, and it described the outcome as "disappointing."

 

It came just a few weeks after U.N. nuclear chief Yukiya Amano said he had won assurances from senior Iranian officials in Tehran that an agreement would be struck soon.

 

Herman Nackaerts, the IAEA's global head of inspections, said after the eight-hour meeting at its headquarters in Vienna that no date for further discussions on the matter had been set.

 

The IAEA had been pressing Tehran for an accord that would give its inspectors immediate access to the Parchin military complex, where it believes explosives tests relevant for the development of nuclear arms have taken place and suspects Iran may now be cleaning the site of any incriminating evidence.

 

The United States, European powers and Israel want to curb Iranian atomic activities they fear are intended to produce nuclear bombs. The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is meant purely to produce energy for civilian uses.

 

Six world powers were scrutinizing the IAEA-Iran meeting to judge whether the Iranians were ready to make concessions before a resumption of wider-ranging negotiations with them in Moscow on June 18-19 on the decade-old nuclear dispute.

 

The lack of result may heighten Western suspicions that Iran is seeking to drag out the two sets of talks to buy time for its uranium enrichment programme, without backing down in the face of international demands that it suspend its sensitive work.

 

"It should by now be clear to everyone that Iran is not negotiating in good faith," a senior Western diplomat said.

 

A European envoy also accredited to the IAEA said: "This is a dismal outcome ... Iran is simply wasting time with its evasions and refusal to engage."

 

Nackaerts said his team had come to the meeting with a desire to finalize the deal and had presented a revised draft that addressed earlier stated concerns by Iran.

 

"However, there has been no progress," he told reporters.

 

"And indeed Iran raised issues that we have already discussed and added new ones. This is disappointing. A date for a follow-on meeting has yet to be fixed."

 

Late last month, Amano returned from a rare, one-day visit to Tehran saying the two sides had decided to reach a deal and that he expected it to be signed soon.

 

Pierre Goldschmidt, a former chief U.N. nuclear inspector, said Iran likely did not want to make any concession to the IAEA just 10 days before the Moscow talks without getting something in exchange.

 

"It is indirectly a deliberate and unnecessary insult to Director-General Amano who recently went to Tehran in order to reach a deal," he said.

 

Mark Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official and now a director at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank in London, said:

 

"This situation is reminiscent of the Peanuts cartoon of Charlie Brown repeatedly believing Lucy this time will hold the football for him to kick, with her always snatching it away at the last minute, leaving him to fall flat."

 

Iran's IAEA ambassador, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said after Friday's talks that work on a so-called "structured approach" document, setting the overall terms for the IAEA investigation, would continue and there would be more meetings.

 

"This is a very complicated issue," Soltanieh said. "We have decided to continue our work and we are going to decide on the venue and date soon ... and we hope that we will be able to conclude this structured approach."

 

Asked about Parchin, Soltanieh said: "That is in fact one of the problems. The more you politicize an issue which was purely technical it creates an obstacle and damages the environment."

 

Both Iran - which insists it will work with the U.N. agency to prove allegations of a nuclear weapons agenda are "forged and fabricated" - and the IAEA said earlier that significant headway had been made on the procedural document.

 

But differences persisted over how the IAEA should conduct its inquiry. The United States said this week it doubted whether Iran would give the IAEA the kind of access to sites, documents and officials it needs to get to the bottom of its suspicions.

 

"Opening discussions with Iran is easy; closing a deal is incredibly difficult," said Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment think-tank. "The graveyard of international diplomacy is littered with failed Iran deals."

 

The talks pursued by world powers are aimed at defusing tension over Iran's nuclear works that has led to increasingly tough Western sanctions on Iran, including an EU oil embargo from July 1, and stoked fears of another Middle East war.

 

Full transparency and cooperation with the IAEA is one of the elements the world powers - the United States, Russia, France, Britain, China and Germany - are seeking from Iran.

 

But they also want Iran to stop its higher-grade uranium enrichment, which Tehran says it needs for a research reactor but which also takes it closer to potential bomb material.

 

For its part, Iran wants sanctions relief and international recognition of what it says is its right to refine uranium.

 

"The lack of progress at the talks today casts a shadow on the upcoming Moscow talks," U.S. proliferation expert David Albright said. "Iran appears once again to be choosing stonewalling over transparency and confrontation over negotiations."

 

But Cliff Kupchan, a Middle East analyst at consultancy Eurasia Group, said he did not expect the outcome in Vienna to have major implications for the Moscow meeting.

 

"The Iranians always bob and weave before meeting with the (six world powers), trying to get leverage," he said.

http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/en_us/noticias/internacional/2012/5/23/nuclear-watchdog-Iran-fail-reach-deal-probe,d5eb9d6d-cb83-4bf2-843c-cffa9aa2b20b.html

http://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/news/local/article_d0c4478c-b594-11e1-a4d3-0019bb2963f4.html

Posted: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:17 pm

MARILYN H. KARFELD
Senior Staff Reporter

Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon without war dominated a June 12 dialogue presented at Siegal College in Beachwood by the Cleveland Peace Action Education Fund.

Author Peter Beinart, an Orthodox Jew whose most recent book “The Crisis of Zionism” has generated criticism from the mainstream American Jewish community, and Jamal Abdi, policy director of the National Iranian American Council in Washington, D.C., approached the topic from similar perspectives.

Diplomacy and negotiations – not a military strike, the threat of war or even tougher sanctions – will keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, both men said. They agreed that the real U.S. goal is not limited to an Iran free from nuclear weapons but also a more democratic government in the Islamic country: in short, regime change.

Getting Iran to deal with the West and to encourage a free exchange of ideas is the ultimate goal, Abdi said. “Our policy of sanctions and isolation runs counter to this. The Khamenei (Iran’s ruling cleric Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) regime thrives on this.”

Negotiations between Iran and the U.S., China, Britain, France, Russia and Germany, which last took place in late May in Baghdad, are next scheduled for June 18 and June 19 in Moscow.

“There is no military solution” to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, said Abdi. “You can’t bomb away the knowledge” Iran has on enriching uranium and building a nuclear weapon.

A ground war with 700,000 U.S. troops and 100,000 Allied troops, along with a long occupation, would be required to dismantle Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, something which is not feasible, he said. A limited military strike is just “mowing the lawn,” as it would set back Iran’s nuclear program only by several years, Abdi said. Three years later it would be necessary to strike again.

At present, Iran has not made the decision to produce a nuclear weapon, Abdi said. But it is producing 20%-enriched uranium, which the U.S. and other Western nations want scaled back to the 3.5% grade needed for energy purposes.

“If the Iranians continue down this road and we do nothing,” they could build a nuclear weapon and put the device on a missile in several years, he said.

Demanding a complete end to the enrichment program would result in Iran ending International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors’ access to its facilities, Abdi said. “I argue that it’s better to have verification than demand zero enrichment, a non-starter for negotiations. Iran has a right to a civilian nuclear energy program.”

Congress is pressing the Obama administration to toughen sanctions against Iran, which will make negotiations impossible, Abdi said. If the U.S. or Israel bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will provide justification for Iranian hardliners insisting on developing nuclear weapons, he said. And human rights remain a concern, after a harsh crackdown on dissent following protests of the 2009 Iranian presidential election.

Beinart, an associate professor of journalism and political science at City University of New York, said two political traditions in Israel frame the way its leaders see foreign problems. The first is the tradition of self-reliance, which means “never outsourcing our security to anyone else,” a philosophy behind Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor.

Second, the Holocaust underlies the Israeli tendency to see foreign threats in extermination terms, said Beinart, who edits The Daily Beast blog Open Zion.

In Israel, the political debate is focused on domestic issues, said Beinart. “I don’t get the sense that Israel is obsessed by the topic” of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon.

While Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has denied the Holocaust’s existence and has called for “wiping Israel off the map,” Beinart said

Iran does not present an existential threat to Israel “because Iran is not suicidal.” Iran is concerned about “its own self-preservation and is not going to imperil its survival by provoking Israel.”

Still, Iran does present an actual threat to Israel, he said, and Iran’s nuclear program empowers it in the region and emboldens Iranian proxies like Hezbollah.

“The real debate is what is the best way to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon” and an Israeli military strike is a bad idea, he said. Israel knows it has limited capacity to repeatedly bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, so the Jewish state has to prompt the U.S. to take military action, Beinart said.

President Barack “Obama is very concerned about the perception that American power is declining in the Middle East,” said Beinart. Allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons adds to that narrative, he said. Still, the U.S. is very skeptical about military action, as the country “is tired and deep in debt.”

Diplomacy is forestalling Iran’s work on a nuclear weapon, but Congress has limited the Obama administration’s ability to negotiate with Tehran, Beinart said. Even if Iran stopped its nuclear enrichment program, Congress may not allow Obama to end the sanctions against Iran, citing, for instance, the Islamic state’s funding of Hezbollah, designated a terrorist group.

Nobody knows the consequences if Israel bombs Iran’s uranium enrichment plants, but Abdi lists a number of possible scenarios Iran might undertake: retaliation with missiles lobbed into Israel and at the country’s nuclear facilities; activation of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups; and mining the straits of Hormuz, leading to sky-rocketing oil prices.

Iran might also go the United Nations and use international law to increase the isolation of Israel, Abdi said.

He criticized AIPAC’s call for tougher sanctions as “boxing in the (Obama) administration and European governments in terms of what is acceptable in negotiations.” The president can’t use sanctions as leverage when Congress makes it impossible for him to lift any of them, Abdi said.

Sanctions and threats of military action only make sense if the U.S. is willing to hold out a carrot, Beinart said. “It’s unrealistic to expect Iran to give up everything and the U.S. to give up nothing.”

Powers want "diamonds for peanuts" - Iran ex-official


Couldn't have been said better!

By Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA | Fri Jun 15, 2012 8:13pm BST

(Reuters) - A former Iranian negotiator on Friday dismissed as "diamonds for peanuts" a proposal by world powers that Tehran halt higher-grade uranium enrichment and close an underground nuclear site in exchange for reactor fuel and civil aviation parts.

Hossein Mousavian, now a visiting scholar at Princeton University in the United States, said he did not believe Iran would accept the offer when the two sides hold a new round of discussions in Moscow on June 18-19.

It will be the third meeting since diplomacy restarted in April after a 15-month hiatus.

"I do not expect too much," said Mousavian, a senior member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team in 2003-05.

If the major powers are not ready to move on the critical issues of gradually removing sanctions on Iran and recognising its right to refine uranium, "I'm afraid the Moscow talks also would fail," he told Reuters in a telephone interview.

Mousavian held his post before conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took over from his reformist predecessor Mohammad Khatami in 2005. Western envoys who know Mousavian say that at the time he appeared to be genuinely interested in reaching a deal with the West.

The six powers - the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia - want to make sure Iran does not develop nuclear bombs. The Islamic Republic wants a lifting of sanctions and recognition of what it says are its rights to peaceful nuclear energy, including enriching uranium.

European Union officials said on Monday that Iran had agreed to discuss a proposal to curb its production of higher-grade uranium at the meeting in the Russian capital, an apparent attempt to reduce tensions ahead of the talks.

The development followed more than two weeks of wrangling between Iranian diplomats and Western negotiators over preparations for the closely watched round of negotiations.

Mousavian said Iran was ready for a "big deal" on the decade-old nuclear dispute, but political constraints in the United States ahead of November's presidential election and other factors meant the other side was not.

"President Obama has very limited room to manoeuvre in an election year," Mousavian said. Barack Obama's Republican opponents have attempted to paint him as soft on enemies of the United States.

"DELIBERATELY UNGENEROUS"

In the immediate term, the powers want Tehran to cease enriching uranium to 20 percent fissile concentration, because such production represents a major technological advance en route to making weapons-grade material.

They put forward a proposal on how to achieve this at a round of talks in Baghdad in May, in which Tehran would stop production, close the Fordow underground facility where such work is done, and ship its stockpile out of the country.

In return, they offered to supply the Islamic state with fuel for a medical research reactor in Tehran, which requires 20-percent uranium, and to ease sanctions against the sale of commercial aircraft parts to Iran.

No agreement was reached in Baghdad but the seven countries agreed to continue discussions in Moscow.

"I believe this is diamonds for peanuts," Mousavian said, adding that Iran already had fuel rods. "Therefore this is not something great to offer Iran."

The International Crisis Group think-tank said the powers' offer "was deliberately ungenerous" and likely to have been meant as an opening bid in what they regarded as a longer process of negotiations.

But a U.S. nuclear expert, David Albright, said Mousavian's comments showed the "difficulty of negotiating" with Iran.

The agreement sought by the powers in Moscow would be a small but important step which does not solve the Iran nuclear issue, said Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) think tank.

"Iran should expect only a small incentive in return ... the fact of the matter is that these actions are equivalent to peanuts for peanuts," Albright said in an email.

Mousavian said, however, that Iran was ready for confidence-building measures regarding its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, which it started in 2010 and has since expanded.

He said his own proposal was that Iran would agree to eliminate such material from its stockpile, either by converting it to fuel, exporting it or lowering its enrichment concentration to 3.5 percent - the level usually required for power plants.

(Editing by Rosalind Russell)

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/15/uk-nuclear-iran-demands-idUKBRE85E19U20120615

Iran nuclear talks stall in 'tense and tough exchange'

Iran nuclear talks stall in 'tense and tough exchange 'International talks in Moscow on Iran's nuclear program have stalled. Both sides have so far refused to soften their positions in order to reach a compromise solution.

Negotiations in Moscow between six world powers and Iran over the Islamic Republic's disputed nuclear program stalled on Monday, with both sides refusing to come to a compromise on their respective positions.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council - China, France, Russia, the UK and US - and Germany are trying to force Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program. The talks in Moscow are the third round this year, coming after fruitless negotiations in Istanbul and Baghdad.

"We had an intense and tough exchange views," said Michael Mann, a spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who represents the six power group.


dw.de
Iranians feel the impact of sanctions
Inflation, the embargo on oil sales and a ban on international banking transactions have begun to hurt the Iranian economy. Dissatisfaction among the population is on the rise. (18.06.2012)
Tehran has enriched uranium to 20 percent purity, a level higher than needed for power generation and considered a short technical step away from weapons-grade material. The EU and the US accuse Iran of seeking to build a nuclear bomb, while the Iranians claim they need the higher enriched uranium to produce isotopes for medical research.

Iran has said that progress would only be made in Moscow if the six powers recognized Tehran's right to peaceful nuclear power. The Islamic Republic also called for immediate relief from international sanctions before making any agreement on uranium enrichment.

The US has implemented an oil embargo against the Iran, which has reduced the Mideast nation's petroleum production by 40 percent, according to the International Energy Agency. An EU oil embargo is scheduled go to into effect on July 1st, further isolating Iran economically.

'No adjustments'

During May talks in Baghdad, the six power group offered Iran technical assistance for nuclear safety and to help repair the country's aging aircraft fleet. The six powers say they have have refused to put anything else on the table.

"In terms of adjustments, no,” said Mann. “What is on the table was put on the table in Baghdad.”

Israel has indirectly threatened to launch airstrikes against Iran if negotiations fail to stop the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. The Jewish state's deputy prime minister, Moshe Yaalon, said on Sunday that military action was preferable to an Iranian nuclear weapon.

"Should that be the choice, then bombing [Iran] is preferable to a bomb [in Iran's hands]," Yaalon said. "I hope we do not face that dilemma."

With international tensions already high over escalating violence in Syria, an attack on Iran could trigger a broader conflagration in the Middle East. That in turn could hurt a global economy already fragile over the eurozone debt crisis.

The talks in Moscow are expected to continue through Wednesday.

slk/rc (AP, AFP, Reuters)

http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16035046,00.html

Iran nuke meeting to continue on lower level


High-level negotiations between Iran and six world powers were suspended after two days of talks in Moscow failed to bridge differences over the future of Iran's nuclear programme.

Contacts will now be downgraded to the level of experts from each country and bureaucrats from Brussels and Tehran. However, it was unclear how such technical discussion could help heal a substantial political rift.

"We set out our respective positions in what were detailed, tough and frank exchanges," said the EU foreign policy chief, Lady Ashton. "However, it remains clear that there are significant gaps between the substance of the two positions."

"The choice is Iran's," she added. "We expect Iran to decide whether it is willing to make diplomacy work, to focus on reaching agreement on concrete confidence-building steps, and to address the concerns of the international community."

The plan is for technical experts from both sides to meet in Istanbul on 3 July, to "increase the understanding" of the Iranian positions. After that there would be contacts between deputy negotiators from Iran and Ashton's office, and then between Ashton and the chief Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to decide whether it was worth resuming talks between Tehran and the six negotiating powers – the UK, US, France, Germany, China and Russia.

Officials from all sides insisted that downgrading the talks did not amount to a total breakdown of diplomacy, well aware that such a declaration could bring closer an Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear sites. The decision to hold another technical meeting, made at the eleventh hour of the Moscow talks, was said by some to be a face-saving device to avoid pronouncing the talks dead on the Russian government's watch.

"They want the process to die some place else," one participant said.

Ashton denied that the planned low-level contacts amounted to talks for talks' sake, saying Iran had "engaged for the first time in the substance" of the proposal it was being offered, but she admitted there was "a very, very long way to go".

The foreign secretary, William Hague, issued a statement regretting "that Iran was not prepared to negotiate seriously on specific concerns of the international community – in particular regarding 20% enrichment."

"This is a missed opportunity to address the serious concerns of the international community," Hague said.

Speaking to the press after the Moscow talks, Jalili portrayed the agreement to hold expert meetings as an Iranian success. Prior to Moscow, Iran had said it wanted such technical discussions but Ashton's office had rejected the call saying it was time to talk about the substance of Iran's nuclear programme and its future.

In the runup to this week's talks, Iranian negotiators clarified their position and presented a response to a compromise offer by the six-nation group. However, the clarity in comparison with the last round in Baghdad simply served to emphasise the gulf between the two sides.

"We are hopeful that the technical meeting … can reach acceptable conclusions and give proposals so that Ms Ashton and I can reach a decision regarding the time and place for the next negotiations," Jalili said.

The six powers' proposition was for Iran to stop making 20%-enriched uranium, seen as the most serious proliferation threat, shut down the underground plant, and transfer its stockpile out of the country under international monitoring. In return for these concessions, summarised as "stop, shut and ship", Iran would get fabricated fuel plates for a medical research reactor, help with nuclear safety, and spare parts for commercial airliners.

Iranian negotiators rejected the deal as unacceptable, asking instead for international recognition of its right to enrich uranium in principle, and relief from sanctions, in return for suspension of 20% enrichment and co-operation with an investigation by UN inspectors into evidence of a past weapons programme.

The Moscow talks hit a low point when Jalili and his delegation arrived at the hotel venue some 90 minutes after the arranged time and asked for the planned plenary session to be put back two hours. Ashton refused to agree to political and legal expert groups, threatening at one point to end the contacts entirely, western diplomats at the talks said. However, by agreeing to meeting between nuclear experts, they said any ambiguity in the various proposals on the table can be removed, and the door left open to a resumption of full talks at a later date.

The failure to make progress in the talks in Moscow makes Israeli military action more likely, but far from inevitable.

"It's in the interests of both sides to keep talks going. Neither has any interest in declaring the death of diplomacy, especially when there is a looming threat of an Israeli strike," said Michael Herzog, a retired Israeli general.

"The Israeli reaction will be negative. Israel will say the result highlights the fact the parties are unable to continue on a high level. The differences cannot be resolved on a technical level. Israel will declare that diplomacy is failing and will probably demand the international community to set a timetable and just not let talks go and on."

Daryl Kimball, the head of the Arms Control Association in Washington insisted that Moscow should not be the end of the road for diplomacy.

"As tough as the P5+1 talks have been, diplomacy remains the best option to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran," Kimball said. "There is still time and an opportunity for diplomacy, but it is essential to reach a deal to prevent that 20% enriched uranium stockpile from growing and soon."


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/19/iran-nuclear-talks-downgraded?newsfeed=true

Iran Officials Assert Defiance of West in Aftermath of Nuclear Talks

By THOMAS ERDBRINK
Published: June 20, 2012


TEHRAN — Iranian politicians and military commanders said Wednesday that their country would never relinquish what they called its nuclear rights, a day after talks between Iran and world powers in Moscow failed to make substantive progress in the dispute over Iran’s uranium enrichment.

Some commanders even asserted that Iran was not only impervious to Western threats but poised to dominate economically, despite evidence that the accumulation of sanctions on Iran, which are set to intensify in a few weeks, could cripple its ability to sell oil, the country’s economic lifeline.

But the higher-ranking Iranian officials who set out the countries policies and whose comments determine the scope of reactions to international events have not yet publicly reflected on the outcome of the Moscow talks.

Besides the Tuesday news conference by Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, in Moscow, who said the talks had been “realistic and serious,” there has been no reaction by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The talks yielded no result other than a lower level technical meeting in two weeks and only the possibility of the top negotiators getting together.

The technical meeting will take place a few days after the European Union’s July 1 embargo on Iranian oil and ban on shipping insurance for Iranian oil, which will vastly complicate Iranian oil sales to Asian buyers. Most maritime insurers are based in Europe and they are prohibited from writing policies on any Iranian oil shipped anywhere. South Korean officials on Wednesday told the Korean Yonhap news agency the new sanctions would force them to completely stop buying oil from Iran, even though the country secured an American waiver allowing South Korea to buy some Iranian oil without incurring penalties under a United States law that sanctions Iran. Japan, another major customer of Iranian crude that has secured an American waiver, is taking steps to provide government guarantees on insurance.

A senior member of Iran’s parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, in a Wednesday news conference, stressed that the Moscow talks had been positive for Iran as they allowed the country to gauge whether the world powers are serious in the negotiations. “Iran submitted a good proposal to them,” he said.

While Iran’s leaders initially showed optimism over renewed talks on their nuclear program in April, they became disappointed after what they say was the United States withdrawal of a promise to affirm their right to enrich uranium.

Iran is in violation of a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt all forms of uranium enrichment. Iran regards the resolutions as illegitimate.

Western powers and Israel have accused Iran of stockpiling enriched uranium as part of an effort to achieve the capability to make nuclear weapons. The Iranians have denied those accusations and say a fatwa, or religious decree, by Ayatollah Khamenei forbids such weapons as against Islam.

Iranian leaders, including President Ahmadinejad, have hinted that if the world powers officially accepted Iran’s nuclear energy program, Iran would halt its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity, which is considered a technical step away from weapons grade purity of 90 percent.

“The world powers should recognize Iran’s nuclear rights. Iran will never give up its right to achieve peaceful nuclear technology," Mr. Bahonar told the state Islamic Republic News Agency.

The rial, Iran’s currency, lost some value against the dollar and euro in the aftermath of the Moscow talks, partly on expectations that the looming new sanctions on Iran would further impair its economy. The rial has lost over half its value relative to the dollar in the past 12 months, which has doubled prices of many imports.

There have been no new calls from Iranian officials telling citizens to be prepare for difficult times, but the commander-in-chief of the voluntary paramilitary forces said Wednesday said that world powers would fail in their coercion efforts.

“Iranian people are ready to prove that the world powers are nothing, which means that they cannot wage a war or put pressure on Iran," the commander, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi, was quoted as saying by the semiofficial Fars news agency.

Some said Iran’s economy was in its best shape ever and poised to emerge as a world powerhouse.

The commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, said that "60 percent of the energy of the universe has been secured by Iran,” the semiofficial Islamic Labour New Agency reported, making Iran ready to “dominate the world economy.”

Pressures and sanctions have only made Iran stronger, he concluded. “Today we are witnessing the political funeral of the West,” General Salami said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-officials-assert-defiance-of-west-in-aftermath-of-nuclear-talks.html

How hopes of a deal with Iran ended in meltdown

Iran's team dismissed the conditions as an infringement of its sovereignty

Kim Sengupta Author Biography



No one involved in the latest round of talks between Tehran and six world power wanted to be too alarmist in public out of fear that may open the door to military action in an already incendiary region, but the hopes of a diplomatic settlement over Iran’s nuclear programme have been severely damaged by the failure of the negotiations in Moscow.

The road to the conference in Russia had been paved by two high level meetings in Istanbul and Baghdad, but instead of progress of substance being made, it ended in acrimony, mistrust and the downgrading of further contacts.

At the end of three days of gruelling sessions, the European Union’s head of foreign policy, Baroness Ashton, stated: “ It remains clear that there are significant gaps between the substance of the two positions”. It was up to Iran, she added, on whether it wants “to address of the international community”.

EU and US sanctions targeting Iran’s oil export sector come into force on 1 July and 28 June  respectively, amid warnings that further punitive measures may follow. Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister, said sanctions should “continue to be tightened as long as Iran refuses to negotiate seriously.” A senior Western diplomatic source said: “We’ll be looking at our partners in this and also countries in places like the Gulf to see how this can be effectively implemented.”

There is, however, an anxiety to play down the scale of the  breakdown because, it is felt, that would encourage hawks in Israel to further press for  strikes to destroy Tehran’s capacity to acquire the Bomb. A persistent theory is that any air attack must take place before the US elections in a period when Barack Obama would find it difficult not to give full backing.

Senior American and British diplomatic and military sources maintained, however, that there is an understanding between the Obama administration and Binyamin Netanyahu’s government that there will be no pre-emptory action before November.

The group of six powers, Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany, want Iran to “stop, shut and ship” – end enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity, transfer stockpiles out of the country under international supervision and shut the underground facility where much of it is produced. In return, Tehran would get fuel plates for a nuclear reactor focusing on medical research, an easing of the current economic sanctions and spare parts for commercial airliners.

Iran’s team, led by chief negotiator Saeed Jalili, dismissed the conditions as an infringement of its sovereignty and demanded instead international recognition that it has the right to enrich uranium for what it claims are peaceful purposes and relief from sanctions. In exchange, it offered temporary suspension of the production of 20 per cent enrichment and co-operation with UN inspectors over past weapons programmes.

Mr Jalili reiterated Iran’s basic position that its enrichment of uranium is non-negotiable, and that “there is no reason or excuse to have doubt regarding the peaceful aims of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

Russian officials met the Iranian team on several occasions, but failed to soften their stance. “There is certainly a danger that the talks will collapse,” said Alireza Nader, an Iran specialist at the RAND Corporation in Washington. “At some point Iran may conclude that the talks are fruitless and that it won’t get what it wants. The sequencing [of possible consequences] appears to be a big problem here. I wouldn’t say the talks are pointless. But I also fear the negotiations are on shaky ground.”

Technical experts on both sides will meet in Istanbul on 3 July to “increase the understanding of the Iranian position” and attempt to find common ground. “It may not seem much from the outside, but this leave the door open” said Robert Emerson, a security analyst. “The last thing they want is to give a pretext for an Israeli attack and the destabilization that will cause”.


http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-hopes-of-a-deal-with-iran-ended-in-meltdown-7869894.html

^ Word. The Iranian delegation must be taking yoga classes or their on Valium.

Otherwise

THE text of Iran's negotiation proposal to the "P5+1" group last month makes clear what Iran's "red lines" are in the nuclear talks, and where it might be willing to compromise.

The Iranian PowerPoint presentation, obtained from a source close to the talks, stresses Iran's status as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the right to enrich uranium. Iranian negotiators devoted the first part of their presentation in Moscow to this topic, under the title: "Why enrichment is an inalienable and chartered right under the NPT."

To buttress their argument on enrichment, the Iranians cite several passages in the treaty, plus references in other international documents. Some US and Israeli experts question this claim, given what they say is the vagueness of the treaty. But it's clear that Iran sees recognition as the cornerstone of any deal.

Enrichment has always been the decisive issue in nuclear talks. The P5+1 demands that Iran stop enrichment until it's in full compliance with all UN resolutions. Iran insists on its NPT rights.

Some Iranian officials have indicated that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei might accept a deal in which Iran is allowed some modest enrichment activity, but agrees to limit production below the level of roughly 800kg needed to make a bomb - exporting, say, 400kg each time it nears that threshold. But there's no hint of any such "win-win" formula in the negotiating documents.

The Iranian document does signal some flexibility on the P5+1's "confidence-building" demand that Iran stop enriching to 20 per cent and export its existing stockpile of such fuel. The hint comes in a vaguely worded offer to "cooperate with 5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed for TRR," a reference to the Tehran Research Reactor that uses 20 percent fuel. Iranian sources say this opens the door for agreement to "stop and ship" production of the 20 percent fuel.

But even if a formula could be negotiated on the 20 per cent issue, two big problems would remain. First, the Iranians emphatically reject the P5+1 demand that they close the enrichment facility at Fordow, buried deep under a mountain near Qom. Explaining why this facility is so heavily fortified, the document states: "Facing constant threats, we need a back-up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities." This is precisely what worries the United States and Israel.

A deeper problem is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu views the 20 per cent issue as a diversion. Israeli officials see Iran's estimated 140 kilograms of 20 percent fuel as the "cherry" on top of its stockpile of about 6000 kilograms of 3.5 per cent enriched uranium that could be pumped up within a year to make a half-dozen nuclear bombs. Netanyahu argues it would be a mistake to accept the cherry but leave Iran with the cake.

Much of the Iranian document summarizes their well-known positions. In a section titled "a framework for comprehensive and targeted dialogue for long-term cooperation," Tehran proposes the basic trade-off: Iran "emphasizes ... its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa against such weapons." In return, the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia would recognize Iran's rights under the NPT, "particularly its enrichment activities."

Iran also proposes "transparency measures" that would include cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency on what the IAEA said in March are "possible military dimensions" of Iran's avowedly peaceful program. In exchange, the US and its allies would halt their unilateral sanctions outside the UN framework.

Complicating matters further, the Iranians also propose cooperation on "regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain," in exchange for their help "combating piracy and counter-narcotic activities." This linkage of non-nuclear with nuclear issues probably won't fly with Washington.

If the experts' talks break down, the question will be whether negotiations might resume on another track. Some Iranians have signaled that Tehran might be ready for secret bilateral talks with the US, but time is short, and election-year pressures will make real bargaining difficult. Meanwhile, sanctions squeeze tighter and the threat of Israeli military action looms.

One final item in the 48-page document caught my eye - a warning that Iran may need even more 20 per cent fuel than anticipated because of plans for "at least four other research reactors" and for exporting enriched fuel "to other countries." Maybe that's a bargaining chip, or maybe it's a sign these negotiations really are headed into the ditch.


http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/tehran-sets-terms-for-a-nuclear-compromise/story-e6frg6so-1226420433635

Some Facts about Iran's Nuclear Activities

Posted on June 14, 2012 by comehomeamerica

[From PANA, a fact sheet on Iran by Dr. David Morrison. Much gratitude to chairman, Roger Cole for allowing us to reprint at Come Home America.  PDFs are available for print out. --Angela]

Summary

“The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran’s nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.” (Reuters Special Report, 23 March 2012[1])

       Iran has no nuclear weapons

       Iran has no nuclear weapons programme

       The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, has said that the possession of nuclear weapons is a “grave sin”

       The November 2011 report of the IAEA did not claim that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme

       Iran is not in breach of any obligations under the NPT

       Uranium enrichment is Iran’s “inalienable right” under the NPT

       The US and its allies are trying to deny Iran its right to uranium enrichment under the NPT

       Iran’s nuclear facilities are open to IAEA inspection, Israel’s are not

       A double standard is being applied with regard to nuclear weapons in the Middle East:-

(1)    Iran, which has none, is the object of ferocious economic sanctions and threats of military action;

(2)    Israel, which has many (perhaps as many as 400) and the ability to deliver them to any capital in the Middle East, is the object of over $3 billion a year of military aid.

       The US, Israel and others, who are threatening military action against Iran, are in breach of Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which requires that all UN member states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.

Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapons programme

It is the consensus view of the 16 US intelligence services that Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapons programme, let alone a nuclear weapon [2].

That has been their consistent view since November 2007, when they first published it in the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE], Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities [3].

The publication of the NIE caused President George Bush to abandon any thought of taking military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.  As he wrote in his memoir, Decision Points:

“But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons program?” (see Annex A)

Commenting on the NIE, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, who was the IAEA Director General at the time, noted that “the Estimate tallies with the Agency’s consistent statements over the last few years that, although Iran still needs to clarify some important aspects of its past and present nuclear activities, the Agency has no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran.” [4]

This view that Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapons programme has been reiterated every year since 2007 in reports to the US Congress by the US Director of National Intelligence.

On 16 February this year, for example, giving evidence to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the present Director, James Clapper, was asked by the Committee Chairman, Senator Carl Levin, to confirm that in his opinion Iran has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons.  The Director replied unequivocally: “That is the intelligence community’s assessment” [5].

According to the US intelligence services, the Israeli intelligence services “largely agree” with their assessment of Iran’s nuclear activities.  The Directorsaid so in later evidence to the Committee [6].  This was confirmed by the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Benny Gantz, in an interview with Haaretz on 25 April 2012 [7], who expressed the view that Iran hadn’t decided to develop nuclear weapons and probably wouldn’t decide to do so.

A Reuters Special Report, dated 23 March 2012, entitled Intel[ligence] shows Iran nuclear threat not imminent [1], came to the following conclusions:

“The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran’s nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.”

The Report says that those conclusions were “drawn from extensive interviews with current and former US and European officials with access to intelligence on Iran” and “contrast starkly with the heated debate surrounding a possible Israeli strike on Tehran’s nuclear facilities”.  Indeed, they do.

Nuclear weapons a “grave sin” says Supreme Leader of Iran

Iran has repeatedly denied that it has any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.  What is more, Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has declared the possession of such weapons a “grave sin”.  He did so in a speech to nuclear scientists on 22 February 2012, saying:

“The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons.  There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.” [8]

There was nothing new in this statement.  In 2005, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa – a religious edict – saying that “the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons” [9] and he has repeated this message many times since then [10].

Iran is not in breach of its obligations under the NPT

Iran is not in breach of its obligations as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [11].

As a “non-nuclear-weapon” state party to the NPT, Iran is obliged under Article II of the treaty “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”– which it hasn’t done – and, under Article III, to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted for the production of weapons – which it has done.

As regards the latter, Iran has declared to the IAEA 15 nuclear facilities, including its uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, and 9 other locations (LOFs) where nuclear material is customarily used.  All these sites are being monitored by the IAEA.  In his latest report to the IAEA Board on 24 February 2012 [12], the IAEA Director General confirmed for the umpteenth time that there was no diversion of nuclear material from these facilities:

“… the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement …” (Paragraph 50)

Uranium enrichment is Iran’s “inalienable right” as a party to the NPT

It must be emphasised that Iran is not breaching the NPT by enriching uranium.  On the contrary, uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is “the inalienable right” of all parties to the NPT, Article IV(1) of which states:

“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” [11]

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and South Korea, which like Iran are “non-nuclear-weapon” state parties to the NPT, have uranium enrichment facilities (as have the 5 “nuclear-weapon” state parties to the NPT: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) [13].

Iran is not in breach of the NPT by engaging in uranium enrichment, so long as this activity is under IAEA supervision to ensure that no nuclear material is diverted for military purposes.  That is the case at Iran’s uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow – and the IAEA has verifed that no material is being diverted and that each facility is operating as declared by Iran in the relevant design document.

In order to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon, uranium has to be enriched to over 90% U235.  At the moment, enrichment has not gone beyondthe 20% figure, which is required to fuel a research reactor in Tehran (supplied to Iran by the US in the late 60s).  This has been verified by the IAEA, which in each of its reports on Iran’s nuclear activity gives an inventory of the amounts of uranium enriched to 5% and 20% at each facility (see, for example, paragraphs 10 to 27 of its latest report [12]).

If Iran were to proceed to enrich uranium to a level above 20%, that is, towards the 90% level required to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon,this would be immediately apparent to the IAEA.

November 2011 IAEA report

But surely the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 on Iran’s nuclear activities [14] presented evidence that Iran has an active nuclear weapons programme?  The answer is an unequivocal NO.

Like all other IAEA reports on Iran, the November 2011 report gives detailed information on the activities at its nuclear facilities.  For example, it records the amounts of uranium enriched to 5% and 20% at each facility and confirms that enrichment hadn’t taken place to a higher level and that no nuclear material is unaccounted for.  This is factual information, based on actual observations by IAEA inspectors on the ground in Iran.

Famously, the November 2011 report contains a 16-page annex entitled Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme.  The “information” contained in this annex is of a very different character.  None of it was acquired by IAEA inspectors as a result of direct observations in Iran.  It consists of allegations – the words “alleged”, “allegedly” and “allegation” occur 28 times in total – supplied to the IAEA by third parties, including the US and Israel, most of them referring to possible activities by Iran before 2003.

Most of these allegations have been available to the IAEA since 2005 and were already in the public domain.  Despite being pressed by the US and its allies to publish them, the previous IAEA Director General, Dr Mohammed ElBaradei, refused do so, because they were unsubstantiated allegations that couldn’t be verified by the IAEA.

Dr ElBaradei retired on 30 November 2009.  His successor is Yukiya Amano of Japan.  The US used its considerable influence to get him elected by the IAEA Board, understandably so, since in the opinion of the US mission to the IAEA, he is “solidly in the US court on every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program” (see Wikileaks cable dated 16 October 2009 [15] and Annex B below).

It is hardly surprising that, unlike his predecessor, Director General Amano acceded to US demands that the allegations supplied by the US and other third parties be published under the name of the IAEA and thereby be given credibility.

(*)

The annex of the November 2011 IAEA report contained little or nothing new – and did not present evidence that Iran has an active nuclear weapons programme.  To confirm this, here are the views of a number of experts on the matter:

Joseph Cirincione, who serves on Hillary Clinton’s International Security Advisory Board, (and is the president of the disarmament group, the Ploughshare Fund):

“I was briefed on most of this stuff several years ago at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. There’s little new in the report. Most of this information is well known to experts who follow the issue.”  (quoted by Seymour Hersh in Iran and the IAEA, The New Yorker, 18 November 2011 [16]).

Professor Paul Pillar, who retired from the CIA in 2005 after 28 years service, his last post being National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia:

“Despite references in the surge of report commentary about new evidence on this or that aspect of the subject, the report told us nothing of importance to policy on Iran that was not already well known.” (The IAEA’s Yawner, The National Interest, 10 November 2011, [17]).

Peter Jenkins, who was the UK’s ambassador to the IAEA from 2001 to 2006:

“The IAEA says that prior to 2003 Iran researched some of the know-how needed for a weapon, and that further research may have taken place in the years since. The IAEA has not reported evidence of attempts to produce nuclear weapons, or of a decision to do so.”  (The deal the West could strike with Iran, Daily Telegraph, 23 January 2012, [18])

Hans Blix, former head of the IAEA:

“The IAEA did not … conclude that Iran was making a weapon or had taken a decision to make one.” (The road to hell, The New Statesman, 22 February 2012, [19]).

The US and its allies want to deny Iran its right to uranium enrichment

So, what’s the problem with Iran’s nuclear activities?  Why are the US and its allies imposing ferocious economic sanctions on Iran and are contemplating a military assault on its nuclear facilities?

These days, the message from the US and its allies is that Iran is failing to meet unspecified international obligations.  Speaking alongside President Obama at the White House on 15 March 2012, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, put it this way:

“We also discussed the continuing threat posed by Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations.  On this, we are fully united.  We are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  We believe there is still time and space to pursue a diplomatic solution and we are going to keep coordinating closely with our P5+1 partners.  At the same time, we are going to keep up the pressure with the strongest US sanctions to date and the European Union preparing to impose an embargo on Iranian oil.  Tehran must understand that it cannot escape or evade the choice before it: meet your international obligations or face the consequences.” [20]

But, if the US intelligence services are to be believed, Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapon, or even a programme to develop nuclear weapons.  And its nuclear facilities are being monitored by the IAEA as required by the NPT.  So, how can there be a “continuing threat posed by Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations”?  What are the “international obligations” which Iran’s failure to meet warrants ferocious economic sanctions and possible military attack?

These days, the US and it allies rarely specify the “international obligations” that Iran is evading, understandably so, because they are obligations that no other state in this world is being asked to fulfil.

First and foremost, as we will see below, Iran is being asked to cease uranium enrichment on its own soil and cease it permanently.  This is a transparent attempt to deny Iran its “inalienable right” under Article IV(1) of the NPT “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”.  It demands that Iran accept permanent treatment as a second-class party to the NPT, with fewer rights than all other parties.

That is why, despite having to endure economic sanctions of increasing severity and being threatened with military attack, Iran continues to refuse to meet what the US and its allies term “international obligations”.

The EU states required Iran to cease enrichment permanently

A little bit of history.  In October 2003, the Foreign Ministers of the UK, France and Germany visited Tehran and initiated discussions with Iran on a broad range of issues, including its nuclear programme.  In a statement issued with Iran at the time, the three EU states said:

“Their governments recognise the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT.” [21]

This was a clear statement that these EU states accepted that Iran had a right to uranium enrichment on its own soil like other parties to the NPT.  This clear statement was repeated in the later Paris Agreement signed by Iran and the three EU states (aka E3/EU) on 15 November 2004 [22], which said:

“The E3/EU recognise Iran’s rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.”

The Paris Agreement set the scene for negotiations between the E3/EU and Iran, which were supposed to lead to a long term comprehensive agreement.

In the Paris Agreement, Iran agreed “on a voluntary basis” to suspend “all enrichment related and reprocessing activities”.  In turn, the E3/EU recognized that “this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation”.

The final agreement was supposed to “provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes”, that is, arrangements over and above the requirements of the NPT for monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities in order to give confidence to the outside world that they are not for military purposes.

The UK, France and Germany published proposals for a final agreement on 5 August 2005 [23].  These demanded that Iran make “a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors”, in other words, all enrichment and related activities on Iranian soil had to cease for good.  Iran was required to make permanent its voluntary suspension of these activities.

The UK, France and Germany had negotiated in bad faith and broken their commitment at the outset to “recognise the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT”.  Iran was to be the only party to the NPT that was forbidden to have uranium enrichment on its own soil.

The EU states made no attempt to devise “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes”, as required by the Paris Agreement.  In the course of the negotiations, Iran made a number of proposals in this regard [24], for example,

       immediate conversion of all enriched uranium to fuel rods to preclude the possibility of further enrichment

       continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.

Iran also suggested that the IAEA be asked to devise appropriate “objective guarantees”.  All of these suggestions were ignored by the EU states.

In a speech at the UN on 17 September 2005, President Ahmadinejad made a further proposal:

“As a further confidence building measure and in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran. This represents the most far reaching step, outside all requirements of the NPT, being proposed by Iran as a further confidence building measure.” [25]

This offer by Iran to have its enrichment programme managed by an international consortium was also ignored.  US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, went so far as to describe Ahmadinejad’s speech as “excessively harsh and uncompromising” [26].

The EU states (and the US) were not interested in “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes”.  Their goal was to halt permanently the core elements of the programme – uranium enrichment and related activities.

Jenkins says the “objective was to put a stop to all enrichment in Iran”

That this was the goal of the US and its allies in 2005 was confirmed recently by Peter Jenkins, who was the UK Ambassador to the IAEA from 2001 and 2006 and was involved in these negotiations.  Looking back, he regrets that Iran’s offer of additional safeguards was not taken up.  Writing in the Daily Telegraph on 23 January 2012, he said:

“My hunch is that this gathering crisis could be avoided by a deal along the following lines: Iran would accept top-notch IAEA safeguards in return for being allowed to continue enriching uranium. In addition, Iran would volunteer some confidence-building measures to show that it has no intention of making nuclear weapons.

“This, essentially, is the deal that Iran offered the UK, France and Germany in 2005. With hindsight, that offer should have been snapped up. It wasn’t, because our objective was to put a stop to all enrichment in Iran [my emphasis]. That has remained the West’s aim ever since, despite countless Iranian reminders that they are unwilling to be treated as a second-class party to the NPT – with fewer rights than other signatories – and despite all the evidence that the Iranian character is more inclined to defiance than buckling under pressure.

“But that missed opportunity need not prove lethal if the West can pull back now and join the rest of the world in seeing an agreement of this kind as the prudent way forward.” [18]

This is persuasive evidence that the obstacle to a settlement with Iran on the nuclear issue at that time was the refusal of the US and its allies to recognise Iran’s right under the NPT to uranium enrichment on its own soil.

There is no reason to believe that this policy has changed.

Iran referred to the Security Council and sanctioned

Understandably, Iran rejected the August 2005 proposals from the UK, France and Germany and over the next six months or so resumed the various activities which it had voluntarily suspended during the negotiations.  As a result, the US and its allies persuaded the IAEA Board to pass a resolution on 4 February 2006 [27] demanding, inter alia, that Iran “re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development” and referring the matter to the Security Council.

Subsequently, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions demanding that Iran cease uranium enrichment, amongst other things.  Four of these resolutions included tranches of economic sanctions against Iran.

These UN-approved sanctions were relatively mild.  However, in December 2011, legislation was passed by the US Congress at the behest of the Israeli lobby (and accepted by President Obama, who dare not offend the Israeli lobby), which may do significant damage to the Iranian economy.

The legislation requires the Obama administration to bully other states around the world to stop trading with Iran, specifically, to stop buying Iranian oil, by threatening to cut off foreign financial institutions from the US financial system, if they conduct transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institutions.  (Whatever happened to the US commitment to free trade?)  Its own trade with Iran will be unaffected since it has been negligiblesince the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

The EU has meekly followed the US lead, even though this may be economically painful for some EU states (eg Greece and Italy) who get a significant amount of their oil requirements from Iran.

On 20 March 2012, the US graciously conceded that the financial institutions in 11 states would, for the next 180 days at least, be exempt from US sanctions, because they had obeyed Washington’s edict. In a statement, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said:

“I am pleased to announce that an initial group of eleven countries has significantly reduced their volume of crude oil purchases from Iran – Belgium, theCzech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As a result, I will report to the Congress that sanctions pursuant to Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 (NDAA) will not apply to the financial institutions based in these countries, for a renewable period of 180 days.” [28]

The degree to which this US bullying will succeed remains to be seen.  For instance, will China reduce its substantial oil purchases from Iran?  And, if it refuses to do so, will the US cut off Chinese financial institutions from the US financial system – which has the potential for disrupting trade between the US and China?

Iran & Israel: applying a double standard

What a strange world we live in?  The US and its allies, which claim they want to see the Middle East free from nuclear weapons, are applying ferocious economic sanctions, and threatening military action, against Iran, which hasn’t got a single nuclear weapon – and its nuclear facilities are open to IAEA inspection.

However, they are utterly opposed to applying any sanctions to Israel, despite its possession of perhaps as many as 400 nuclear warheads with the ability to deliver them by aircraft, ballistic missile and submarine-launched cruise missiles and wipe any capital in the Middle East (and probably much further afield) off the map – and its nuclear facilities are almost entirely closed to the IAEA.

Far from sanctioning Israel, the US gives it over US$3 billion a year in military aid and, despite an enormous budget deficit, the amount has increased every year under the Obama administration, as the President was at pains to emphasise in his speech to AIPAC on 4 March 2012 [29].  More US tax dollars go to Israel than to any other state in this world.

One could be forgiven for thinking that a double standard is being applied to Iran and Israel in this regard.

The US and its allies frequently say that, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, this would inevitably lead to widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in theMiddle East.  That, they say, is one of the reasons why Iran must not be allowed to acquire them.

What is rarely mentioned is that, because of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran and other states in the region would at this moment be within their rights to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons as Israel, which never joined the NPT, has done, without breaching any international obligations.

Article IX of the NPT says:

“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” [11]

By any objective standard, Iran and other states in the region have good grounds for withdrawal, because, since they signed the NPT, Israel has acquireda large nuclear arsenal, which is sure to be targeted on them.  There could hardly be a better example of “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty”, which “have jeopardized [their] supreme interests”.

It might not be wise for Iran or other states in the region to withdraw from the NPT at the present time but there is no doubt that such an action would be within Article IX of the NPT.

(Saudi Arabia is usually mentioned as being certain to acquire nuclear weapons, if Iran does so.  In this context, it is worth drawing attention to remarks by Jack Straw, the former British Foreign Minister, in the House of Commons on 20 February 2012 [30].  He questioned whether there would be a race for nuclear capability in the region and quoted a senior Saudi diplomat who told him: “I know what we’re saying publicly, but do you really think that having told people that there is no need for us to make any direct response to Israel holding nuclear weapons, we could seriously make a case for developing a nuclear weapons capability to deal with another Muslim country?”)

On breaching “international obligations”

The US and its allies are forever lecturing other states about living up to their “international obligations”.

The UN Charter contains a set of international obligations, which all UN members are supposed to fulfil.  The most fundamental of all is in Article 2.4, which requires that all UN member states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” [31].

By threatening military action against Iran, the US and Israel and other states (including the UK) are in flagrant and continuous breach of Article 2.4.

The US and Israel should be expelled from the UN under Article 6 of the Charter, which provides for the expulsion of a member which “has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter”.  That’s not going to happen, of course, since the US is a veto-wielding member of the Security Council (which must recommend any expulsion) and the other is its close ally.

That’s the way the UN system works, or rather doesn’t.

Annex A:  George Bush was “angry” at NIE finding

In the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, produced in November 2007, the 16 US intelligence services expressed the consensus view that Iran hadn’t got an active nuclear weapons programme at that time.

The reaction of President George Bush to this good news is instructive – it made him “angry”.  We know this because he says so in his memoir, Decision Points.

One might have thought that the President would have welcomed intelligence that Iran wasn’t developing nuclear weapons.  After all, preventing Iranacquiring nuclear weapons was supposed to be a major objective of his foreign policy.

But instead he was “angry” – because it cut the ground from under his efforts to gain international support for what he termed “dealing with Iran”, which clearly went beyond ensuring that it did not possess nuclear weapons.  Specifically, it made it impossible for him to take military action against Iran:

“The NIE didn’t just undermine diplomacy.  It also tied my hands on the military side. There were many reasons I was concerned about undertaking a military strike on Iran, including its uncertain effectiveness and the serious problems it would create for Iraq’s fragile young democracy. But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons program?”

The NIE had a big impact, he concluded – and not a good one.

(The full text of the President’s comments on the NIE can be read at [32]).

Annex B:  IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano

In July 2009, Yukiya Amano was elected by the IAEA Board to succeed Dr Mohamed ElBaradei as Director General of the IAEA, having been Japan’s Ambassador to the IAEA from 2005.

Wikileaks cables from the US mission to the IAEA to the US State Department demonstrate the closeness of his relationship with the US.  He has been elected by the narrowest of margins over the South African Ambassador to the IAEA, Abdul Minty, thanks largely to US support.

At a meeting on 16 September 2009 with the US NPT Special Representative Susan Burk, he acknowledged his debt to the US in this regard, saying to her ”if you are determined, the US can do anything!” (see cable dated 16 October 2009 [15]).

The US looked forward with enthusiasm to Amano replacing ElBaradei.  In a cable dated 10 July 2009 [33], the American Chargé d’Affaires, Geoffrey Pyatt, wrote:

“The IAEA transition that will come as DG [Director General] ElBaradei’s term ends November 30 provides a once-a-decade opportunity to overcome bureaucratic inertia, modernize Agency operations, and position the new director general for strong leadership from the DG’s office.”

In the October cable cited above, he was described as “DG of all states, but in agreement with us”.  According to the same cable:

“Amano reminded [the] ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the developing countries group], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the US court on every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.”
The October cable ended by saying that “his willingness to speak candidly with US interlocutors on his strategy and various balancing acts bodes well for our future relationship”.  The US had good reason to be satisfied with the new Director General.

Dr David Morrison

May 2012

References:

[1]  uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/uk-iran-usa-nuclear-idUKBRE82M0GI20120323

[2]  www.david-morrison.org.uk/iran/iran-no-nuclear-programme.htm

[3]  www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf

[4]  www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2007/prn200722.html

[5]  c-spanvideo.org/program/ThreatstoUSN (39 minutes in)

[6]  c-spanvideo.org/program/ThreatstoUSN (96 minutes in)

[7]  www.****.***/news/diplomacy-defense/idf-chief-to-haaretz-i-do-not-believe-iran-will-decide-to-develop-nuclear-weapons-1.426389

[8]  www.presstv.ir/detail/228014.html

[9] www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehr080905.html

[10]  www.juancole.com/2012/03/khamenei-takes-control-forbids-nuclear-bomb.html

[11]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf

[12]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-9.pdf

[13]  www.ieer.org/reports/uranium/enrichment.pdf

[14]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf

[15]  www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/230076

[16]  www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2011/11/iran-and-the-iaea.html

[17]  nationalinterest.org/node/6144

[18]  www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9033566/The-deal-the-West-could-strike-with-Iran.html

[19]  www.newstatesman.com/middle-east/2012/02/iran-nuclear-israel-iraq

[20]  www.number10.gov.uk/news/press-conference-by-david-cameron-and-barack-obama/

[21]  www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml

[22]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf

[23]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc651.pdf

[24]  www.****.***/news/05/nov/1211.html

[25]  www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050918-irna02.htm

[26]  www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/politics/27assess.html

[27]  www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf

[28]  www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/186086.htm

[29]  www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-0

[30]  www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120220/debtext/120220-0002.htm

[31]  www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

[32]  www.david-morrison.org.uk/iran/iran-bush-on-nie.htm

[33]  www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/215499

http://comehomeamerica.wordpress.com/2012/06/14/some-facts-about-iran-noiranwar/